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ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND NETWORKS OF RELATIONSHIPS
Yong-Ju Lee, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
The fundamental question I address in the dissertation is how the behavior of economic
agents interacts with networks of relationships which underlie a wide set of economic situ-
ations. In Ch. 2, entitled Decentralized Information Sharing in Oligopoly,I analyze the
incentives of rms for information sharing in a decentralized environment when rms face a
stochastic demand. In order to do that, I develop a two stage model of strategic network
formation, where a cooperative network formation stage is played in the rst stage and a
noncooperative Bayesian Cournot game is played in the second stage. I derive pure strategy
mixed cooperative and noncooperative equilibria that are subgame perfect and stable, and
characterize the resulting network structures. Ch. 3, entitled A War of Attrition in Net-
work Formation,investigates the strategic behavior of agents when they face a decision on
the formation of relationships. I apply a war of attrition to the dynamic network formation
process when links among agents have characteristics of public goods. Agents are randomly
but exogenously matched in each stage. Based on Bala and Goyals (2000) two-way ow
model, I characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes and discuss their e¢ ciency.
Finally, Ch. 4, entitled Social Norms and Trust among Strangers,(with Huan Xie) studies
the development of trust and reciprocity among strangers in the indenitely repeated trust
game with random matching. If reputation is attached to the community as a whole and if
a single defection leads to the destruction of the cooperative social norm through contagious
punishments, the cooperative social norm can be sustained by the self-interested community
members in the equilibrium. We provide su¢ cient conditions that support the social norm
of trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Networks of relationships play a critical role in a wide set of economic and social situations.
For instance, personal contacts play important roles in obtaining information about job
opportunities. Such networks of relationships also underlie the trade and exchange of goods
in non-centralized markets, the provision of mutual insurance in developing countries, R&D
and collusive alliances among corporations, and international alliances and trade agreements.
Given the prevalence and importance of network structures, the literature on the formation
of networks among agents addresses various questions: Some examples are how such network
structures are important in determining the outcome of economic interaction, how we predict
which networks are likely to form when agents have the strategic discretion to choose their
connections, and how e¢ cient the networks are.
The fundamental question I address in this dissertation is how the behavior of economic
agents interacts with networks of relationships which underlie a wide set of economic situ-
ations. In order to do that, I categorize the network structures into the purely endogenous
networks, the purely exogenous networks, and mixed endogenous and exogenous networks,
and then analyze the behavior of individual agents, oligopolistic rms, and the community
as a whole.
The purpose of the rst paper (Ch. 2) is to investigate rmsincentives to form a net-
work in order to share information in an oligopolistic market where rms face an uncertain
demand. Many papers have analyzed the existence of incentives to share private information
in stochastic market environments. (See, Clarke (1983), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1982), Raith (1996), and Vives (1984).) These papers show that it is unclear
whether the exchange of information about an uncertain world has a protable e¤ect on the
rms when they compete against each other as Nash competitors in the product market.
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This is because the results crucially depend on the markets random variables, their distri-
bution, the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand), and the nature of information.
On the other hand, it is well known that, with an unknown common demand, information
sharing is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome under Bertrand competition and concealing
information is the unique equilibrium outcome under Cournot competition (Vives (1984)
and Gal-Or (1985)). And, with unknown private costs, information sharing is the unique
Nash equilibrium outcome under Cournot competition and concealing information is the
unique equilibrium outcome under Bertrand competition (Gal-Or (1986)). Here we show
that the results on information sharing vary depending on whether the decision is made in
a centralized or decentralized environment.
The second paper (Ch. 3) investigates the strategic behavior of agents when they face
a decision on the formation of relationships. Many social and economic relationships that
benet both the corresponding parties are e¢ ciently established by the e¤ort of a single
initiative party. Inviting new neighbors for a dinner and links between politicians and busi-
nessmen can be examples. Under this consideration, we observe that links among economic
agents in Bala and Goyals (2000) two-way ow model have such properties of public goods
among linked agents. Once relationships are established by someone, others can use this
network of relationships freely as long as they are parts of the given network. However, the
costs of link formation are incurred only by the agents who initiate the links. So each agent
strongly wants to wait for others to initiate a link to him. This kind of a waiting situation
allows us to analyze network formation in the framework of a war of attrition where the
strategy of an agent is the specication of the set of waiting times among agents with whom
he plays the game. The main goal of this paper is to understand how and which network
structures emerge as equilibrium outcomes when links among agents have such properties of
a public good and all agents want to wait. Also we investigate who volunteers to initiate
the link and pays for link formation in the network formation process, and who would be a
center if the star network is formed.
Finally, my third paper (Ch. 4) asks how to sustain cooperative equilibrium when play-
ers have an incentive to deviate from cooperation, since they are completely anonymous and
they meet at randomly determined times. Economists have long recognized reputationas
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an e¤ective means of enforcing cooperative behavior, but these personal enforcement mech-
anisms are e¤ective only if quick and substantial retaliations are available. However, many
important transactions in reality are infrequent in nature and many transactions happen
among essentially anonymous players. Electronic transactions are done between strangers
who have no contact except through cyberspace. In this case only partial information about
a strangers reputation is available at best, and, therefore, the e¤ectiveness of reputation is
far less certain. This observation raises important question about economic behavior. What
factors drive the emergence of trust and reciprocity in economic transactions? In order to
analyze this question, previous papers consider a random matching model under the most
extreme information restriction. We theoretically extend Kandoris (1992) arguments to the
trust game.
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2.0 DECENTRALIZED INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLOY
2.1 MOTIVATION
The purpose of this paper is to investigate rmsincentives to form a network in order to
share information in an oligopolistic market where rms face an uncertain demand. Many
papers analyzed the existence of incentives to share private information in stochastic market
environments. (See, Clarke (1983), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982),
Raith (1996), and Vives (1984).) These papers show that it is unclear whether the exchange
of information about an uncertain world has a protable e¤ect on the rms when they
compete against each other as Nash competitors in the product market. This is because the
results crucially depend on the markets random variables, their distribution, the nature of
competition (Cournot or Bertrand), and the nature of information. On the other hand, it is
well known that, with an unknown common demand, information sharing is the unique Nash
equilibrium outcome under Bertrand competition and concealing information is the unique
equilibrium outcome under Cournot competition (Vives (1984) and Gal-Or (1985)). And,
with unknown private costs, information sharing is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome
under Cournot competition and concealing information is the unique equilibrium outcome
under Bertrand competition (Gal-Or (1986)). Here we show that the results on information
sharing vary depending on whether the decision is made in a centralized or decentralized
environment.
Network structures play a signicant role in determining the outcome of many important
economic relationships.1 Although the previous papers analyze the possibility of collabora-
1For instance, personal contacts play important roles in obtaining information about job opportunities.
Such networks of relationships also underlie the trade and exchange of goods in non-centralized markets, the
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Figure 1: Centralized Information Sharing
tion or cooperation among rms, they impose severe restrictions on the interaction structure
among the rms. The literature explicitly or implicitly assumes the existence of an "outside
agency" such as a trade association. This agency collects private information from rms and
disseminates it throughout the industry. In the terminology of the network literature, they
assume that the network structure is a star network where the central node is the trade as-
sociation and the periphery nodes are the rms. This is equivalent to assuming the complete
network among the rms without an outside agency.2 This interpretation is without loss of
generality since the literature has not treated the outside agency as a player in the game,
and, instead, the outside agency is modeled as a purely mechanical part of the environment,
with no decisions to make. Therefore, once a rm decides to reveal its information on its
private signal, the rm has to share it with all the other rms at the same time. In this
sense, the previous literature assumes that each rm faces an exogenously given centralized
market structure and makes an industry-wide decision.
In this paper, we reexamine the incentives for information sharing in a decentralized
setting. For this purpose, we endogenize the network formation process explicitly in the
model. Each rm selects with which rms to collaborate and share information with the un-
derstanding that rms engage in noncooperative competition in the product market. And,
provision of mutual insurance in developing countries, R&D and collusive alliances among corporations, and
international alliances and trade agreements. (Refer to Jackson (2004) for an excellent survey.)
2By the complete network we mean the graph in which each rm has a direct link with every other rm.
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only linked rms can share information bilaterally. That is, the present paper studies the
information sharing problem in oligopoly where each rm faces a decentralized market struc-
ture and engages in a pair-wise desision.3 Collaboration and cooperation among rms are
common in oligopolistic markets (Goyal and Joshi (2003)). As Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez
(2001) indicate, a distinctive feature of collaboration or cooperation among rms is that they
are often bilateral interactions that are embedded in a broader network. Even in situations
where rms i and j, and j and k have a cooperative relationship, respectively, rms i and k
may not have such a relationship. These structural features justify incorporating strategic
network formation in the existing information sharing literature.
Another innovative aspect of our model resides in the choice of the degree of information
sharing. In much of the previous literature, rms decide the degree of information sharing
by choosing the level of variance of a message (which is a random variable). Given that
the network structure is complete as mentioned above, rms share information uniformly
with all the other rms at the same time. For example, they reveal information completely
if the variance in messages is zero, while they dont share information if the variance is
innity. In our model, the rms choose the degree of information sharing by selecting the
set of rms with which they want to form collaborative links. It is assumed that a link
involves a commitment on bilateral and truthful information sharing between the linked
rms. The rms share information completely if the resulting graph is a complete one, while
they dont share information if the resulting graph is an empty one.4 Therefore, we can say
that the previous literature measures the degree of information sharing by "depth," while
the present paper measures it by "width." In this sense, we might view the current paper as
complementary to the existing literature on information sharing.
We consider a simple two stage game. In the rst stage, rms strategically form pair-wise
links which allow them to obtain the othersprivate signals regarding the stochastic market
demand. We assume that only the directly linked rms can share information bilaterally,
3We argue that pair-wise information sharing is more natural and realistic than any other forms in the
world. First, pair-wise information sharing captures informal (or, private) and local behaviors among rms
in the market. Second, it seems to be necessary at least as a pre-step to another forms of coalitions such as
the cost reduction alliance, joint venture formation, and R&D agreement. Before those decisions are made,
rms need to know and have an incentive for communicating about their market situations. The author
thanks Esther Gal-Or for pointing this out.
4By the empty network we mean the graph in which there is no link between any two rms.
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and that they share information truthfully if there is a collaborative link between them.
After the link formation, each rm observes its own private signal and they transmit their
private information to the linked rms simultaneously. In the second stage, after informa-
tion transmission, each rm chooses its level of output in the product market. That is, a
Bayesian Cournot game is played in the second stage. Following the spirit of dAspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), we derive pure strategy mixed cooperative and noncooperative equi-
libria that are subgame perfect and (pairwise and strongly) stable, and characterize the
resulting graphs. That is, given a collaborative network structure, rms compete with each
other as Nash competitors in the product market in order to maximize their own prots, and
rms cooperate bilaterally in the rst stage so as to overcome market uncertainty and, hence,
to maximize their own prots with the understanding that they engage in noncooperative
competition in the second stage. The main questions we address are what is the incentive
of rms to collaborate and what is the resulting network structure, what are the e¤ects of
strategic network formation on individual and industry-wide performance, and why does a
rms incentive to share information depend on whether the network structure is centralized
or decentralized.
We start by characterizing the unique equilibrium decision rule of rms in the product
market. We show that the results of the existing literature easily extend to endogenous
network settings. That is, we show that the equilibrium decision rule is a¢ ne in the vector
of observations available to the rm. We then examine the relationship between network
structure and strategic information exchange. We apply both pairwise stability and strong
stability as solution concepts to the network formation game. We demonstrate that, in con-
trast to the results of the existing literature on centralized information sharing, complete
information sharing, no information sharing, and partial (and asymmetric) information shar-
ing emerge as pairwise stable equilibria when rms face the decentralized market structure
and make pair-wise decisions. Also we show that this result extends to the asymmetric envi-
ronment. This result is interesting in that pairwise stability is a natural solution concept in
the analysis of the decentralized oligopolistic market, since, as Roth and Sotomayor (1990,
p.156) argue, "identifying and organizing large coalitions may be more di¢ cult than making
private arrangements between two parties." However, if we allow for a broader level of co-
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ordination and cooperation among the groups of the rms, no information sharing emerges
as the unique equilibrium outcome. This illustrates that information sharing among rms
facing an uncertatin environment critically depends on the coalition structure. Finally, by
introducing heterogeneity across rms, we can clarify the features of decentralized informa-
tion sharing: In any equilibrium, information is shared among rms with a similar accuracy
(amount) of information. Otherwise, a rm with inaccurate (less) information refuses to
collaborate.
Our paper can be seen as a contribution to the study of group formation and cooper-
ation in oligopolies. Modeling strategic network formation is inspired by Bala and Goyal
(2000), Dutta et al (1995), and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). This paper attempts to study
the relationship between strategic networks and stochastic market environments. Recently
several papers have addressed similar issues to the ones we address in the present paper.
Some examples are Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Goyal and Joshi (2003), and Goyal
et al (2004). These papers highlight the relationship between the rmsincentives for R&D
and network formation. However, here we study the relationship between the incentives for
strategic information exchange in an uncertain market and network formation. This paper,
to the best of our knowledge, is the rst to analyze information sharing among oligopoly
rms in the context of decentralized network formation. Interestingly, the R&D literature
and the information sharing literature frequently study very di¤erent incentives for network
formation even in exactly the same environments. For example, under a homogeneous prod-
uct oligopoly assumption and a small link formation cost, Goyal and Joshi (2003) and Goyal
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) show that the complete network is a stable network under
Cournot competition. Our paper has a very di¤erent prediction.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the model, which consists of
the cooperative network formation game and the noncooperative oligopoly game with a
stochastic common demand. In section 3 we derive equilibria of the game and characterize
equillibrium network structures. Section 4 introduces heterogeneity to the basic model by
assuming that the accuracy of private information is di¤erent across rms. Section 5 discusses
possible extensions and future research. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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Figure 2: Timing of the game
2.2 THE MODEL
In this section we establish the benchmark model where the game involves a symmetric
environment and rms produce homogeneous goods. Section 4 extends the basic model by
introducing heterogeneity across rms.
We consider a two stage game. The timing of the game is shown in Figure 2. In the
rst stage, rms strategically form pair-wise links to obtain information about the stochastic
market demand. After link formation each rm observes its own private signal. Then
rms simultaneously transmit their information to the linked rms. We call this stage
game the network formation game. In the second stage, after information transmission,
each rm chooses its level of output in the market. We call this second stage game the
oligopoly game. Our goal is to derive the pure strategy mixed cooperative and noncooperative
equilibria of the game. Firms coordinate bilaterally in the rst stage so as to overcome
market uncertainty and, hence, to maximize their own prots with the understanding that
they engage in noncooperative competition in the second stage. We examine the incentives
of rms for network formation and the resulting information sharing network structures, and
analyze how completely rms collaborate. Finally, we analyze the e¤ects of the network
structure on both individual and market outcomes. We now develop the notation and dene
our notions of stability and e¢ ciency.
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2.2.1 The network formation game
Let N = f1; 2;    ; ng; n = 3 be the set of ex ante identical rms. In the rst stage rms
form pair-wise links which represent commitments that both rms must honour regarding
bilateral information transmission.5 For any pair of rms i; j 2 N, a pair-wise relationship
between the two rms is represented by a binary variable gij 2 f0; 1g. When gij = 1, this
means that the two rms are linked at cost  respectively, while gij = 0 refers to the case
of no link. In our model, gij = 1 also means that the two linked rms i and j share their
information bilaterally. To avoid reaching a conlusion about collaborative network formation
that critically depends on the link formation cost , we assume that the link formation cost
 is negligibly small. The number of pairwise links represents the degree of information
sharing among rms in the industry. A network g is a collection of links, i.e., g = fgijgi;j2N.
Let gi = fgijjgij = 1gj 6=i be the set of links involving rm i, where g i = fgkgk 6=i is the set
of all the rms except rm i. The set of all possible graphs on N is denoted by G. Let
Ni(g) = fj 2 Nnfigjgij = 1g be the set of rms with which rm i has a link in g, and let
i(g) be the cardinality of the set Ni(g). Let g gij denote the network obtained by severing
an existing link between rms i and j from network g, while g + gij is the network obtained
by adding a new link between rms i and j in network g. A path in g connecting rms i and
j is a set of distinct rms fi1; i2;    ; ikg such that gii1 = gi1i2 =    = gikj = 1. We say that
a network is connected if there exists a path between any pair i; j 2 N. A network, g0  g,
is a component of g if for all i; j 2 g0, i 6= j, there exists a path in g0 connecting i and j,
and for all i 2 g0 and j 2 g; gij = 1 implies gij 2 g0. The prots of rm i in network g are
denoted by i(g), which will be specied in the next subsection.
We shall say that a network g is pairwise stable if and only if for all i; j 2 N :
(i) For gij = 1; i(g)  i(g   gij) and j(g)  j(g   gij)
(ii) For gij = 0; if i(g + gij) > i(g), then j(g + gij) < j(g).
This denition of stability is taken from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). These conditions
indicate that agents need a bilateral (mutual) agreement to form a link, while agents can sever
5The present model has a di¤erent kind of commitment from the one in the previous literature. In the
previous literature there is the commitment between the outside agency and each rm, while in this model
commitment is between the pair of corresponding rms. Because of this commitment problem we choose the
cooperative approach in modeling network formation.
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an existing link unilaterally. To the extent that larger groups can coordinate their actions
to make changes in a network, a stronger solution concept might be needed. Nevertheless,
pairwise stability is a natural solution concept in our model, since, as Roth and Sotomayor
(1990, p.156) argue, "identifying and organizing large coalitions may be more di¢ cult than
making private arrangements between two parties."
Alternatives to pairwise stability that allow for larger coalitions than just pairs of rms
to deviate were rst considered by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). The following denition
is modied from Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005).
A network g0 2 G is obtainable from g 2 G via deviation by S if
(i) g0ij = 1 in g
0 and gij = 0 in g implies i; j 2 S, and
(ii) gij = 1 in g and g0ij = 0 in g
0 implies fi; jg \ S 6= ;.
The above denition identies changes in a network that can be made by a coaltion S
without the need of consent of any rms outside of S. (i) requires that any new links that
are added can only be between rms in S. This reects the fact that consent of both rms
is needed to add a link. (ii) requires that at least one rm of any deleted link be in S. This
reects the fact that either rm with a link can unilaterally sever the relationship.
A network g is strongly stable if for any S  N, g0 that is obtainable from g via a deviation
by S, and i 2 S such that i(g0) > i(g), there exists j 2 S such that j(g0) < j(g).
The denition of strong stability allows for a deviation to be valid if some rms are strictly
better o¤ and others are weakly better o¤, while the denition in Dutta and Mutuswami
(1997) considers a deviation valid only if all rms of a coalition are strictly better o¤. This
stronger notion implies pairwise stability. Strong stability provides a powerful renement of
pairwise stability. The concept of strong stability mainly makes sense in smaller network
situations where agents have substantial information about the overall network structure
and the potential payo¤s.
We now dene some networks that play aprominent role in our analysis. A network is
said to be symmetric if every rm has the same number of links. Otherwise it is asymmetric.
In a symmetric network i(g) = j(g) =  for any two rms i and j. We will denote a
symmetric network of degree  by g; = 0; 1;    ; n   1. In particular, if  = 0; the
nework is called the empty network, while it is called the complete network if  = n   1:
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It can be shown that if the number of rms is even, then there is always a symmetric
network of degree ,  = 0; 1;    ; n   1 (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001)). Among
the asymmetric networks, the dominant group architecture, gd(k), is characterized by one
complete non-singleton component with k  2 rms and n  k singleton rms. Thus, there
is a set of rms Nd  N with the property that gij = 1 for every pair i; j 2 Nd while for
any m 2 NnNd; gml = 0;8l 2 Nnfmg (Goyal and Joshi (2003)). A network is said to be
component-symmetric if every rm in a component has the same number of links.
2.2.2 The oligopoly game
The oligopoly game is based on the existing information sharing literature, especially Gal-Or
(1985, 1986).
The oligopoly consists of n rms producing a product at no cost. We assume the same
type of demand uncertainty as in Gal-Or (1985, 1986). The demand function facing this
industry is linear and stochastic:
p = a  bQ+ u; a; b > 0 (2.1)
The prior distribution of u is normal with mean zero and variance u, p is the price and Q
is the aggregate quantity produced. Before deciding its output quantity, each rm observes
a noisy signal for u; and then transmits it to the linked rms. The signal observed by rm i
is xi. We assume:
xi = ui + ei; ui  N (0; ); ei  N (0;m) (2.2)
where Cov(ei; ej) = 0; i 6= j; Cov(ui; ej) = 0 8 i; j; Cov(ui; uj) = 0; i 6= j; and
u = (
P
i ui) = n; hence u  N (0; n).6 ei is called the signal error. The normal distribution
assumption for these random variables, together with the linearity of demand function,
enables us to derive explicit forms for their conditional and unconditional expected values.
The private signals might be positively correlated, but here we simply assume that they are
6This environment is called a "common values" problem in the auction literature. (Gal-Or (1986))
12
independent.7 Hence a rm cannot make any inference about the signals observed by the
other rms based on its own signal. This fact gives the rms strong incentives for strategic
link formation. Since, by assumption, every rm transmits its private signal to other linked
rms simultaneously, the transmitted information (signals) from others cannot be used to
generate a rms own message. However, note that there are indirect network e¤ects here.
For instance, consider a situation where rms i and j, and j and k have collaborative links to
one another. We can obviously conclude that xk (xi) is unknown information to i (k), since
there is no direct link between i and k. But rm i does know that rm k will use information
transmitted from j, xj, (which is also known to i) to make the optimal decision in the product
market in the second stage, and vice versa. That is, under rational expectations there is an
indirect network e¤ect even though there are no direct spillovers in the model.
We denote by X the vector of true signals observed by all rms. X i designates the
vectors of true signals excluding those of rm i.
After information transmission, the transmitted information is subsequently used by each
rm to choose its output. The output choice depends on the information available to the
rm. For rm i this information consists of network g, its private information xi, the reported
information from other rms fxjj gij = 1gj 6=i, and the known values of the parameters m
and . We denote the information available to i by yi = (g; xi; fxjj gij = 1gj 6=i;m; ). For
example, if n = 5 and we have a wheel (circle) network g = fg12 = g23 = g34 = g45 = g51 = 1g,
then y1 = (g; x1; (x2; x5);m; ). The vector of information that is available to all rms is
denoted by y, and the information available to all rms except rm i is y i.
The oligopoly game is a Bayesian Cournot game in which each rm decides its product
level based on the information available at the beginning of the second stage. We derive the
symmetric equilibrium decision rule for the game beginning at the second stage. Note that,
although we allow asymmetric networks throughout the paper, the unique Nash equilibrium
decision rule in the game beginning at the second stage is "symmetric" in the limited sense
that, given network g, each rm has the same form of decision rule even though its realizations
7If private signals are partially correlated, a rm can make partial inferences about the competitors
signals based on its own signal. This lowers rms incentive for strategic link formation and information
sharing. Therefore this assumption only leads to weakening our results since, as analyzed below, there
already exist strong negative e¤ects of information sharing under Cournot competition.
13
are di¤erent. That is, the rms decision rule is a¢ ne in the vector of signals available to the
rm. Since all rms are ex ante identical, labelling in the network is not important, and the
only thing that matters is the number of links each rm retains given the network structure.
The (stategy) choice of rm i in the whole game is a pair ((gij)j 6=i; qi(yi)) where gij :
N  ! f0; 1g, and qi : G  R Ri(g) 1  ! R. We denote by Q(y) the vector of decision
rules used by all rms, and by Q i(y i) the vector of decision rules of all rms except rm i.
The payo¤ of rm i as a function of the stragegies chosen is:
i(gi; g i; qi(yi); Q i(y i)) = Ey;ufqi(yi)[a  b
X
k
qk(yk) + u]g   i(g) (2.3)
where E is the expected value operator. The Nash equilibrium of the above oligopoly
game (played in the second stage) is Q(y) which satises the following property:
Ji(q

i (yi); Q

 i(y i) j g)  Ji(qi(yi); Q i(y i) j g) 8 i; (2.4)
where qi (); qi() : G R Ri(g) 1  ! R.
2.3 DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIA
At the second stage, rm i chooses its decision rule qi() to maximize:
W = Ey i;ufqi(yi)[a  b
nX
j=1
qj(yj) + u] j yig (2.5)
In (2.5) prots are conditioned on the realization of yi. Variables that remain unobserved at
the beginning of the second stage are the values of the signals observed by all the unlinked
rms fxkj gik = 0gk 6=i, the value of random variable u. Equation (2.5) may be rewritten:
W = qi(yi)[a  bqi(yi)  b
X
j 6=i
Eyj(qj(yj)jyi) + Eu(ujyi)] (2.6)
Firm i chooses its decision rule qi() to maximize (2.6) given the decision rule chosen by the
other rms. When the private signals are independent, Proposition 1 displays the solution
for any nite number of rms.
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Proposition 1. With independent signals, for given g, the following decision rule forms the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game beginning at the second stage:
qi(yi) = A
i
0 +
X
j 6=i
Aijgijxj + A
i
ixi ;8 i (2.7)
where Ai0 =
a
b(n+1)
, Aij =

(j(g)+2)bn(m+)
, Aii =

(i(g)+2)bn(m+)
.
Proof. To maximize (2.6) while taking qj(yj) as given, set:
@W
@qi
= a  b
X
j 6=i
Eyj(qj(yj)jyi) + Eu(ujyi)  2bqi(yi) = 0
and
@2W
@q2i
=  2b < 0:
Hence
qi(yi) =
a  b
X
j 6=i
Eyj(qj(yj)jyi) + Eu(ujyi)
2b
; 8 i (2.8)
Equation (2.8) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the decision rule qi(yi);8 i to be
a Nash equilibrium. Using the posterior distribution of u, E(ujyi) = 1n m+f
X
j 6=i
gijxj + xig;
since E(ujyi) = 1n
nX
k=1
E(ukjyi) = 1n [E(uijxi) +
X
j 6=i
gijE(ujjxj)], and E(uijxi) = m+xi. Using
the suggested solution of the Proposition,
Eyj(qj(yj)jyi) = EfAj0 +
X
k 6=j
Ajkgjkxk + A
j
jxj j yig = Aj0 +
X
k 6=j
Ajkgjkgikxk + A
j
jgijxj: (2.9)
Using these in condition (2.8) and requiring (2.8) to be satised for every possible yi and
yj, yields a system of equations with the same number of unknowns. Solving this equation
system yields the unique solution specied in (2.7). According to Radner (1962) it is su¢ cient
to restrict attention to decision rules of the generic form expressed by (2.7), since the decision
rules must be a¢ ne in the vector of observations available to the rm.
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Since all rms are ex ante identical (they face the same technology and observe signals
of the same precision), only the cardinality of the set Ni(g) matters in characterizing the
decision rule. From this we observe that the rm imposes the same weights on signals
transmitted from other rms as on its own signal as long as they have the same number of
links. Without loss of generality, we assume that qi(yi) is nonnegative. From equation (2.7)
we can see various e¤ects of information sharing. For example, suppose rm i forms a link
to rm l. There are two conicting direct e¤ects. First, there emerges an Ailxl term in the
equation (since xl is now available information to the rm i), which makes qi(yi) increasing.
Second, rm i imposes less weight in its own information xi (since the i(g) component is
in the denominator of Aii), which makes qi(yi) decreasing. Also there are indirect e¤ects
embedded in equation (2.9). Expecting the decision rules of other rms connected to rm
l, rm i can deduce that any rm k also use xl (now known to rm i) as information in its
decision, if glk = 1. We view these e¤ects as a kind of network externality. Next we will see
whether negative or positive e¤ects are bigger in terms of payo¤. By considering the graph
structure explicilty, we can unambiguously capture the e¤ects of information sharing on the
decision rules regarding quantity. This decision rule is reduced to the formula of Theorem 1
in Gal-Or (1985) when the complete network structure is exogenously given and each rm
truthfully transmits its signal to the linked rms.
Now we use this equilibrium decision rule to derive the payo¤s of the subgame that
starts at the second stage, denoted wi(yi; g) for rm i. The payo¤ function in this subgame
starting at the second stage is then used to derive the payo¤ in the game that starts at the
rst stage. Denote this last function by
i(g) = i(qi(g); q i(g)) = Eyi [wi(yi; g)]  i(g) = bEyi [qi(yi)]2   i(g)
The last equality follows directly from the payo¤ function expressed in (6) and the form
of the Nash equilibrium decision rule expressed in (8). We can rewrite i(g) explicitly as
follows:
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i(g) = bEyi [A
i
0 +
X
j 6=i
Aijgijxj + A
i
ixi]
2   i(g)
=
a2
b(n+ 1)2
+
X
j 6=i
gij
2
(j(g) + 2)
2bn2(m+ )
(2.10)
+
2
(i(g) + 2)
2bn2(m+ )
  i(g)
Equation (2.10) follows since V ar(xk) = m+; 8k; and Cov(xi; xj) = 0;8i; j; i 6= j. Note that
this derivation of the payo¤ functions is possible only under the assumptions of the linearity
of market demand fuction and the normality of the signals. We can check the conicting
e¤ects of network formation and information sharing on the payo¤ function in equation
(2.10). With additional link formation (deletion), rm i receives a negative (positive) e¤ect
on the third term in equation (2.10), and experiences a positive (negative) e¤ect from the
second term at the same time. The marginal benet and marginal cost from an additional link
with j are 
2
((j(g)+1)+2)
2bn2(m+)
and 
2(2i(g)+5)
(i(g)+2)
2(i(g)+3)
2bn2(m+)
respectively, while the marginal
benet and marginal cost from severing an existing link to j are 
2(2i(g)+3)
((i(g)+1)
2((i(g)+2)
2bn2(m+)
and 
2
(j(g)+2)
2bn2(m+)
respectively, where i(g) and j(g) are the cardinalities of Ni(g) and
Nj(g) before link formation(deletion).
2.3.1 Pairwise stable networks
We characterize the stable collaborative networks under quantity competition. It turns
out that there exist multiple (symmetric and asymmetric) pairwise stable networks. Recall
that we assume that the link formation cost, , is negligibily small since our main goal is to
study the incentives for information sharing (equivalently, the benet and cost of information
sharing) when rms face uncertainty. The interesting ndings, as we will see, are that even in
the case where  = 0, rms are not willing to form as many links as they possibly can. This
indicates that information sharing itself has a nonneglibibly negative e¤ect on the payo¤ of
the rm.
We think it is natural and important to start by checking the commonly known results
of the existing information sharing literature. Recall that, under unknown common demand,
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no information sharing is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome under Cournot competition
(Vives (1984) and Gal-Or (1985)).
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions (1), (2) and  > 0, both the empty and the complete
network are pairwise stable when n  3.
Proof. First we show that the empty network is pairwise stable. Notice that the stability
condition (i) is trivially satised. Thus we only need to check whether condition (ii) is
satised. Suppose that rms i and j form a link. The resulting network is g0 + gij. We
next check whether rms i and j nd such a deviation protable. Using equation (10), we
have i(g0)  i(g0 + gij) = 236bn2(m+) +  > 0. So condition (ii) is satised. Now we show
that the complete network is pairwise stable. By a similar reasoning, we only need to check
whether pairwise stability condition (i) is satised. Consider again that one of the rms
i and j sever a link. The resulting network is gn 1   gij. Using equation (10), we have
i(g
n 1)  i(gn 1  gij) = j(gn 1)  j(gn 1  gij) = 2bn2(m+)fn
2 2n 1
(n+1)2n2
g   > 0 if n  3.
So condition (i) is satised. Hence the complete network is also pairwise stable.
This result indicates that complete information sharing is also a pairwise stable equilib-
rium. Note that centralized (and industry-wide) decision making, by denition, is exactly
the same as decentralized (and pairwise) decision making if n = 2. So we reasonably expect
that both produce the same result. The following result shows that the empty network (no
information sharing) is the unique equilibrium outcome in a duopoly as in the centralized
setting.
Remark In a duopoly (i.e, n = 2), the empty network (no information sharing) is a
unique equilibrium outcome. From Proposition 2, i(g0)  i(g0+ gij) = 236bn2(m+) +  > 0,
and i(gn 1)  i(gn 1   gij) = 2bn2(m+)fn
2 2n 1
(n+1)2n2
g    < 0 when n = 2. k
With this, we can derive the following result directly from Proposition 2. Recall that the
dominant group architecture, gd(k), is characterized by one complete non-singleton compo-
nent with k  2 rms and n k singleton rms. Thus, there is a set of rms Nd  N with the
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property that gij = 1 for every pair i; j 2 Nd while for any m 2 NnNd; gml = 0;8l 2 Nnfmg
(Goyal and Joshi (2003)).
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions (1), (2) and  > 0, the dominant group architecture,
gd(k), is pairwise stable when k  3.
Proof. Consider any rm i 2 Nd. From Proposition 2, this rm has no incentive to sever
its existing links. That is, 8 i; i(gk 1)   i(gk 1   gij) > 0 when k  3. So the stability
condition (i) is easily satised. We need to check whether this rm has any incentive to form
a link to an isolated rm m.
i(g)  i(g + gim) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+ k
2
b(k + 1)2n2(m+ )
g   f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+(k   1) 
2
b(k + 1)2n2(m+ )
+
2
b(k + 2)2n2(m+ )
+
2
9bn2(m+ )
g+ 
< 0 when k  2.
This means that rm i wants to form an additional link to the isolated rmm. The remaining
thing to check is the incentives of rm m :
m(g)  m(g + gim) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
4bn2(m+ )
g
 f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
9bn2(m+ )
+
2
b(k + 2)2n2(m+ )
g   
> 0 when k  2.
So, the isolated rm wants to remain isolated. Also, following from the previous Corollary,
rm m does not have any incentives to form a link to l 2 Nnfmg. Therefore, the stability
condition (ii) is satised.
This shows that partial and asymmetric information sharing appears as an equilibrium if
rms make a decentralized decision, even though the rms are ex ante identical. In addition,
there exist other (symmetric and asymmetric) equilibrium structures specied below. The
following result incorporates all ndings studied above as special cases.
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Theorem 4. Let F1(N) = fN1;N2;    ;Npg be a partition of N such that 8 i 2 f1;    ; pg,
jNij 6= 2, and 8 i 2 f1;    ; p  1g, jNi+1j > (jNij+1)(jNij+2)p
2jNij+3
 2. Let gjNij 1 denote the complete
network over Ni for all i 2 f1;    ; pg. Then
(1) g(F(N)) =
pS
i=1
gjNij 1 is a pairwise stable network,
(2) If g is component-symmetric and pairwise stable, then g 2 g(F(N)) =
pS
i=1
gjNij 1.
Proof. For the proof of (1): Take any network g(F(N)) =
pS
i=1
gjNij 1 satisfying the conditions
specied. Without loss of generality, take any three rms i; j; and k such that i 2 Ni, j 2 Nj,
k 2 Nj+1 where jNij = 1, jNjj  3. First, we show that the rms j and k have no incentive
to sever their existing link. In Proposition 2 we have shown that j(gjNjj 1)   j(gjNjj 1  
gjl) > 0 if jNjj  3; l 2 Nj. This is true for the case of rm k. So condition (i) of the
denition of pairwise stability is satised. Lets check whether condition (ii) of pairwise
stability is satised. Obviously, the isolated rm i has no incentive for link formation since
i(g)   i(g + gij) > 0 and i(g)   i(g + gik) > 0. Then we only need to investigate the
incentives of rms j and k by checking
j(g)  j(g + gjk) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+ jNjj 
2
b(jNjj+ 1)2n2(m+ )g   f
a2
b(n+ 1)2
+(jNjj   1) 
2
b(jNjj+ 1)2n2(m+ ) +
2
b(jNjj+ 2)2n2(m+ )
+
2
b(jNj+1j+ 2)2n2(m+ )g   
=
2
bn2(m+ )
f 1
(jNjj+ 1)2  
1
(jNjj+ 2)2  
1
(jNj+1j+ 2)2g   
> 0 if jNj+1j > (jNjj+ 1)(jNjj+ 2)p
2jNjj+ 3
  2.
This means that rm j does not agree to form an additional link with k even if rm k tries
to form a link to j. This implies that j does not form a link to any other rm with more
than jNj+1j   1 links. Therefore condition (ii) of pairwise stability is also satised.
For the proof of (2): It su¢ ces to show that each component g0 2 g is complete. We denote
a symmetric component of degree  by g0,  = 2; 3;    ; jNij   1. Suppose that jNij  3.
Then 8 i; j 2 Ni, i(g0) i(g0+gij) = 2f(+3)2 2(+2)2gbn2(m+)(+3)2(+2)2 < 0 for  = 2; 3; ;    ; jNij 2,
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Figure 3: An example of graph F1(N)
and 8 i; j 2 Ni, i(g0jNij 1)   i(g0jNij 1   gij) > 0. Therefore, if g is component-symmetric
and pairwise stable, each component g0 2 g must be complete.
Theorem 4 illustrates the basic feature of pairwise stable network structures. The more
links a rm has, the stronger is its incentive additional information. This property becomes
clear when we introduce heterogeneity into the model in section 4. From this we can summa-
rize our main nding: Unlike the result of previous literature on "centralized" information
sharing, there emerges a broader level of information sharing as pairwise stable equilibria.
Example Suppose n = 4. Then fg0; gd(3); g3g is the set of all pairwise stable networks.
Here we feel it necessary to interpret the results of the present model qualitatively. When
rms behave as Nash competitors in the market, the e¤ects of pooling private information
3g )3(dg 0g
Figure 4: All pairwise stable networks when n = 4
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on the rms prots are unclear. When more accurate information is available, the strategies
can be chosen more accurately. Increased accuracy has an unambiguously positive e¤ect on
the payo¤ of the rm. However, the pooling of private information increases the correlation
among the rmsdecision rules. This increased correlation has ambiguous e¤ects on the
rm. Suppose that a rm observes a signal of low demand and shares it with others. Then it
reduces the likelihood that its competitors overproduce. But when it observes a signal of high
demand and reveals it to others, it reduces the likelihood that its competitors underproduce.
While the rst e¤ect raises the prots of the rm, the second e¤ects reduces them. Hence,
it is unclear whether rms will transmit their private information to rival rms. In the
previous literature, as Gal-or (1985) indicates, the benets from pooling information and
obtaining a more accurate measure of demand are dominated by the losses from increasing
the correlation of rmsoutput decisions. Due to the underlying complete network structure,
the models in the previous literature have much higher correlation among the decision rules
than the present model. Thus, the negative e¤ect dominates and no information sharing is the
equilibrium outcome. In the present model, due to the (decentralized) pairwise interaction
structure, the correlation in the decision rules is lower than in the previous literature. But
there still exists a strong negative e¤ect from correlation of rmsoutput decision.
Until now we have considered pairwise stablity as a solution concept which allows unilat-
eral and pairwise deviation of the rms. As is well known in the network formation literature,
individual or pairwise based solution concepts often lead to multiple stable networks, so that
they provide broad predictions. Nevertheless we would like to emphasize this result, since we
think that pairwise stability is a relevant and natural equilibrium concept in the analysis of
decentralized oligopolistic markets. We can imagine and observe that, in an oligopoly which
consists of Nash competitors, forming a large and credible coalition is quite di¢ cult. In our
context, however, we cannot exclude the possibility of communication among rms that may
allow a number of them to coordinate their choices of links. It is also probable that infor-
mation sharing depends on the coaltion structure. Given such coalitional considerations, we
now study strongly stable networks as a means of making tighter predictions.
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2.3.2 Strongly stable networks
Strong stability of networks is a very demanding property, since it means that no set of rms
could benet through any rearranging of the links that they are involved in (including those
linking to rms outside the coaltion). Such networks are essentially impossible to destabilize,
as there is no possible reorganization that would be improving for all rms whose consent
is needed. We now characterize the strongly stable collaboration networks under quantity
competition.
Remark Under Assumptions (1), (2) and  > 0, neither the complete network, gn 1,
nor the dominant group architecture, gd(k), are strongly stable.
We can show this by way of counterexample. First, consider a certain rm, i, in the
complete network gn 1, and suppose that rm i alone deviates by severing all its links at
once. The strong stability concept captures this kind of deviation while the pairwise stability
does not. Then, rm i is the only singleton rm and the remaining (n   1) rms form one
complete non-singleton component. Formally, the dominant group architecture gd(n 1) 2 G
is obtainable from gn 1 2 G via a deviation by S = fig, and we can check that
i(g
d(n 1))  i(gn 1) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
4bn2(m+ )
g   f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
n2
(n+ 1)2bn2(m+ )
  (n  1)g
=
2
bn2(m+ )
f (n  1)
2
4(n+ 1)2
g+ (n  1) > 0
That is, this kind of deviation is protable. Therefore gn 1 is not strongly stable. Similar
arguments hold in the case of the dominant group architecture gd(k) 2 G. Consider again
a certain rm j in the complete component, (i.e., j 2 Nd), and suppose rm j severs all its
links at once. Then we can nd that another dominant group architecture gd(k 1) 2 G is
obtainable from gd(k) 2 G via a deviation by S = fjg, and we can check that
j(g
d(k 1)   j(gd(k)) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
4bn2(m+ )
g   f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
k2
(k + 1)2bn2(m+ )
  (k   1)g
=
2
bn2(m+ )
f (k   1)
2
4(k + 1)2
g+ (k   1) > 0 when k  2
Therefore gd(k) 2 G is not strongly stable.
This example says that complete information sharing is not an equilibrium outcome if
we allow a broad range of coordination and cooperation among the group of rms in the
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industry. Also it captures the idea that a rm would not benet from severing any single
link but would benet from severing several links simultaneously which is not accounted for
under the concept of pairwise stability. A some discussion of this issue will follow in section
5.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions (1), (2) and  > 0, no information sharing (and the
resulting empty network) is the unique strongly stable equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Suppose that the empty network g0 is not strongly stable. Consider the deviating
coaltion S 3 i; j, and the obtainable graph g0 2 G from g0 2 G via a deviation by S. Needless
to say, g0 must be nonempty. Suppose i(g
0) = 1, gij = 1. Then
i(g
0)  i(g0) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
4bn2(m+ )
g   f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
9bn2(m+ )
+
2
(j(g
0) + 2)2bn2(m+ )
  g
=
2
bn2(m+ )
f5(j(g
0) + 2)2   36
36(j(g
0) + 2)2
g+  > 0
That is, forming a single link is not protable. Hence, every deviating rm in S must form
at least two links simultaneously. Now suppose that every rm in S forms at least two links.
We can show this kind of deviation is not protable either. That is,
i(g
0)  i(g0) = f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
4bn2(m+ )
g   f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
2
(i(g
0) + 2)2bn2(m+ )
+
X
gij
2
(j(g
0) + 2)2bn2(m+ )
  i(g0)g
=
2
bn2(m+ )
f1
4
  1
(i(g
0) + 2)2
 
X
gij
1
(j(g
0) + 2)2
g+ i(g0)
> 0 where i(g
0)  2; j(g0)  2 if gij = 1;8 j
Therefore, a protable deviation does not exist. This contradicts the assumption that g0 is
not strongly stable. Also, this implicitly proves the uniqueness of strongly stable networks.
If there is a nonempty graph g where a typical rm i has a single link, then this rm will
benet from a unilateral deviation by severing the link. Suppose that there is another graph
g0 where each rm has at least two links, or remains isolated. Then each rm with more than
two links will benet from severing all links simultaneously. This completes the proof.
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We reach the same no-information-sharing result as in the previous literature by allowing
all rms to deviate and coordinate their choices simultaneously. It is not a coincidence
that both approaches produce the same result. The concept of strong stability moves the
analysis closer to that of the existing literature; by allowing a wider level of coalition and
cooperation among rms, we allow rms to make an industry-wide decision. The wider the
level of coaltion that is allowed, the more similar are the e¤ects produced. In this sense,
our result extends earlier ndings about the incentives of oligopolistic rms, and can be
regarded as complementary to the existing literature. Also, by charaterizing strongly stable
networks, we have demonstrated that information sharing critically depends on the coaltion
and cooperation structure as well. Note that strong stability is a very demanding property,
in the sense that once formed such networks are essentially impossible to destabilize, as there
is no possible reorganization that would be improving for all of the rms whose consent is
needed. Therefore, this no-information-sharing result cannot understate the pairwise stable
equilibrium outcomes of the model analyzed above. Furthermore, we can carefully state that
the results of the existing literature could be obtained in very restricted situations, since
they reach such results under the exogenously given grand coalition assumption.
2.3.3 E¢ cient networks
For a given network g, social welfare, V (g), is dened as the sum of the consumer surplus and
the aggregate prot of the n rms. We shall say that a network g is e¢ cient if V (g)  V (g),
for all g 2 G. In this subsection we conne our attention to symmetric networks g. When
rms operate in the homogeneous product oligopoly, social welfare is
V (g) =
1
2
bE[Q]2 +
nX
i=1
i(g
) 
nX
i=1
i(g
)
=
1
2
bE[
nX
i
qi(g
)]2 + b
nX
i=1
E[qi(g
)]2  
nX
i=1
i(g
)
= (
1
2
n2 + n)f a
2
b(n+ 1)2
+
X
j 6=i
gij
2
(j(g
) + 2)2bn2(m+ )
+
2
(i(g
) + 2)2bn2(m+ )
g
 ni(g), where i(g) = j(g) = 
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It is easily seen that V (g) is decreasing over  = 0; 1; 2;    ; n 1, since the decrease of the
term 
2
(i(g)+2)
2bn2(m+)
from adding links dominates the appearance of the term gij 
2
(j(g)+2)
2bn2(m+)
.
Therefore, the empty network is the unique e¢ cient outcome among symmetric networks.
Recall that if the number of rms is even, there always exists a symmetric network of degree
,  = 0; 1;    ; n  1 (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001)).
Lemma 6. Suppose that n is even. The empty network (no information sharing) is the
unique (pairwise and strongly) stable and e¢ cient outcome among all symmetric networks.
2.4 HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
In this section we introduce heterogeneity across rms by assuming that rms observe a
noisy signal for u with di¤erent degree of accuracy. We maintain all other assumptions. This
environment enables us to analyze which rm has the larger incentive to share information
when the accuracy of private information is di¤erent across rms. While our goal remains
that of characterizing the set of stable network structures, we can check the robustness of
the basic model by perturbing the model a little. The signal observed by rm i is xi. We
now assume:
xi = ui + ei; ui  N (0; i); ei  N (0;mi) (2.11)
where Cov(ei; ej) = 0; i 6= j; Cov(ui; ej) = 0 8 i; j; Cov(ui; uj) = 0; i 6= j; i <
1; mi < 1;8 i; and u = (
P
i ui) = n; hence u  N (0; 1n2
P
i). With a little calculation,
the following decision rule forms the unique Nash equilibrium of the game beginning at the
second stage:
qi(yi) = A
i
0 +
X
j 6=i
Aijgijxj + A
i
ixi ;8 i (2.12)
where Ai0 =
a
b(n+1)
, Aij =
j
(j(g)+2)bn(mj+j)
, Aii =
i
(i(g)+2)bn(mi+i)
. The payo¤ function
starting at the rst stage is given by:
i(g) =
a2
b(n+ 1)2
+
X
j 6=i
gij
2j
(j(g) + 2)
2bn2(mj + j)
+
2i
(i(g) + 2)
2bn2(mi + i)
  i(g)
(2.13)
We can now characterize the set of stable networks among heterogeneous rms.
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Proposition 7. Under Assumptions (1), (11) and i > 0 8 i, the empty network is always
pairwise stable, and the complete network is pairwise stable if n  3 and 2n+1
n2
<
2j (mi+i)
2i (mj+j)
<
n2
2n+1
; 8 i; j.
Proof. First we show that the empty network is pairwise stable. Using equation (13), we
have i(g0)   i(g0 + gij) = 5
2
i (mj+j) 42j (mi+i)
36bn2(mi+i)(mj+j)
+ . If 52i (mj + j)   42j(mi + i) > 0,
the proof is complete. Suppose 52i (mj + j)   42j(mi + i) < 0. Then we have j(g0)  
j(g
0 + gij) =
52j (mi+i) 42i (mj+j)
36bn2(mi+i)(mj+j)
+  > 0. So condition (ii) is satised. Similarly, we can
show that i(gn 1)   i(gn 1   gij) > 0 and j(gn 1)   j(gn 1   gij) > 0 if n  3 and
2n+1
n2
<
2j (mi+i)
2i (mj+j)
< n
2
2n+1
; 8 i; j.
We can draw many implications from Proposition 7. There are two points we want to
make about this result. First, the empty network is stable since a rm with the less accurate
information of the two declines. It is still true that for any given g, if link formation fails
between any two rms, it is the rm with inaccurate information that refuses to collaborate.
Second, the complete network is stable only when rms with the similar level of accuracy
comprise the network. When rms are symmetric, the complete network is pairwise stable
if n  3 (Proposition 2).
Remark In any equilibrium, information is shared among rms with a similar accuracy
of information. If information sharing fails between any two rms for any network structure,
it is the rm with inaccurate information that refuses to collaborate.
Example Under Assumptions (1), (11) and i > 0 8 i, the dominant group architecture,
gd(k), is pairwise stable if (1) k  3, (2) 2k+1
k2
<
2j (mi+i)
2i (mj+j)
< k
2
2k+1
; 8 i; j 2 Nd, and (3) for any
i 2 Nd and any h 2 NnNd, 2h(mi+i)
2i (mh+h)
> 36
5(k+1)2
or 
2
h(mi+i)
2i (mh+h)
< 9(2k+3)
(k+1)2(k+2)2
. k
gd(k) is pairwise stable when the complete nonsingleton component is formed by the
k rms with similar accuracy (represented by conditions (1) and (2)), and the dominant
group of k rms and n   k singlton rms are signicantely di¤erentiated in their private
information (represented by condition (3)). Also this shows that partial or asymmetric
information sharing emerges as an equilibrium when heterogeneous rms make a decision in
the decentralized way. The following result characterizes all pairwise stable networks, and
incorporates all ndings studied above as special cases.
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Theorem 8. Let N = f1; 2;    ; ng; n = 3 be the set of rearranged rms such that 2i
(mi+i)
>
2i+1
(mi+1+i+1)
, 8 i 2 f1; 2;    ; n 1g. So, rm 1 is the one with the least accurate information,
while rm n is the one with the most accurate information. Let F2(N) = fN1;N2;    ;Npg
be a partition of N such that 8 i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; p  1g, 8 i 2 Ni, j 2 Ni+1, 
2
i
(mi+i)
>
2j
(mj+j)
.
Suppose that g(Ni) is the network over Ni for all i 2 f1;    ; pg. Then g(F2(N)) =
pS
i=1
g(Ni)
is a pairwise stable network i¤
(1) If Ni is nonsingleton, jNij  3 and i(g(Ni))  2, 8 i 2 Ni
(2) For gii+h = 1;
2i (mi+h+i+h)
2i+h(mi+i)
< (i(g)+1)
2(i(g)+2)
2
(i+h(g)+2)
2(2i(g)+3)
, and
for gii+h = 0;
2i (mi+h+i+h)
2i+h(mi+i)
> (i(g)+2)
2(i(g)+3)
2
(i+h(g)+3)
2(2i(g)+5)
, 8 i; i+ h 2 Ni
(3) 8 i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; p  1g, 8 i 2 Ni, j 2 Ni+1, 
2
i (mj+j)
2j (mi+i)
> (i(g)+2)
2(i(g)+3)
2
(j(g)+3)
2(2i(g)+5)
.
Proof. Just use the denition of pairwise stability. Condition (1) allows the existence of
singleton components, condition (2) indicates stability within a component, and condition
(3) guarantees stability between any two rms from distinct components.
This is somewhat abstract, so here we take a special example which captures all the basic
features of the model.
Example: Assortative Networks Let F2(N) = fN1;N2;    ;Npg be a partition
of N such that 8 i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; p  1g, 8 i 2 Ni, j 2 Ni+1, 
2
i
(mi+i)
>
2j
(mj+j)
. So, N1 is
the component which consists of rms with the least accurate information, while Np is the
component which consists of rms with the most accurate information. Suppose that gjNij 1
is the complete network over Ni for all i 2 f1;    ; pg. Then g(F2(N)) =
pS
i=1
gjNij 1 is a
pairwise stable network if
(1) If Ni is nonsingleton, jNij  3 and 2jNij+1jNij2 <
2h(mi+i)
2i (mh+h)
< jNij
2
2jNij+1 ; 8 i; h 2 Ni,
(2) 8 i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; p  1g, 8 i 2 Ni, j 2 Ni+1, 
2
i (mj+j)
2j (mi+i)
> (jNij+1)
2(jNij+2)2
(jNjj+2)2(2jNij+3) .
This is similar to Theorem 4. Condition (1) guarantees the completeness of a compo-
nent. Condition (2) requires that signals should be di¤erentiated enough that rms from the
di¤erent components do not form a link to each other. Partition F2(N) exactly corresponds
to partition F1(N). The size of the component in partition F1(N) has the same role as the
accuracy of rmsinformation in the component in partition F2(N). k
From this we can check the basic features of decentralized information sharing among
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heterogeneous rms: In any equilibrium, information is shared among rms with a similar
accuracy of information. And if information sharing fails between any two rms for any
network structure, it is the rm with inaccurate information that refuses to collaborate.
Also this implies partial and asymmetric information sharing results.
Lemma 9. Under Assumptions (1), (11) and  > 0, no information sharing (and the
resulting empty network) is the unique strongly stable equilibrium outcome.
The results of this section reinforce previous ndings in that partial and asymmetric
information sharing emerges when rms make a decision in a decentralized way. In this
section we introduced heterogeneity across rms by assuming that rms observed a noisy
signal for u with di¤erent degree of accuracy. We show that, unlike the result of the previous
literature on the centralized information sharing, there emerges a broader level of information
sharing as a pairwise stable equilibrium.
2.5 DISCUSSION OF FURTHER APPROACHES
2.5.1 A noncooperative game of network formation
Myerson (1991) suggests a noncooperative game of network formation. For every rm i, the
strategy set is an n  1 tuple of 0 and 1, Gi = f0; 1gn 1. Let gij denote the jth coordinate of
gi. If gij = 1, rm i indicates its willingness to form a link with rm j. Given the strategy
prole g, an undirected network g is formed by letting rms i and j linked if and only if
gijgji = 1. In words, the formation of a link requires the consent of both rms.
A strategy prole g is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all i, all strategies g0i in Gi,
i(g)  i(g0i; g i), and g is called Nash stable. It is easy to see that the concept of Nash
stability is too weak a concept for modeling network formation when links are bilateral. For
instance, the empty network is always a Nash network, regardless of the payo¤ structure.
Moreover, any network where no player could gain by severing some links is a Nash network,
regardless of how attractive it might be to add additional links (Bloch and Jackson (2005)).
Thus, some renement is necessary, and di¤erent directions must be proposed.
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2.5.2 Adding uncertainty about unknown private demands
Until now we have examined how incentives for oligopolists to share information change
depending upon the network structure when there is uncertainty about an unknown common
demand intercept. As is well known, if uncertainty reects unknown private demands, our
results will be signicantly a¤ected. Lets consider this case. The game is played in the
same way as in the previous sections. Now a market consists of the rms, each producing a
heterogeneous product and each rm faces an individual demand shock. The market demand
is still linear, namely
pi = a  biqi  
X
j 6=i
bjqj + ui; a; bi > 0; bi > jbjj;8 j 6= i (2.14)
where pi is the price and qi the amount of product i produced. Since bj can be positive or
negative the two products can be substitutes or complements, and since bi > jbjj;8 j 6= i,
"cross e¤ects" are dominated by "own e¤ects". The closer the coe¢ cients bi and bj are to
each other, the less di¤erentiated the two products are. Assuming a constant a is without
loss of generality, since ui captures heterogeneity in the intercept of the function.
The market demand is stochastic, i.e., ui is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance i.8 The signal observed by rm i is xi. We continue to assume that xi = ui+ei; ei 
N (0;mi); where Cov(ei; ej) = 0; i 6= j; Cov(ui; ej) = 0 8 i; j; Cov(ui; uj) = 0; i 6= j.
We can also allow asymmetry in network structure. We can reasonably expect that the
analysis requires the use of numerical rather than analytical methods since asymmetry in
network structure and heterogeneity in oligopoly cause great complexity and the calculations
are likely to become cumbersome.
2.5.3 Some other issues
Another interesting issue concerns spillovers. Our model does not accommodate direct
spillovers across the collaborative links of rms, since, by assumption, information trans-
missions happen simultaneously. We can study the incentives for information sharing under
a correlated signals assumption. By doing so, we may vary the amount of initial correlation
8This environment is called a "private values" problem in the auction literature. (Gal-Or (1986))
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among the signals to investigate how various degrees of initial correlation a¤ect the incentives
for network formation and information sharing.
Another extension would be to investigate whether the incentives for network formation
and information exchange are a¤ected by other sources of uncertainty in the market. In
particular, stronger incentives may arise if technology rather than demand was stochastic, or
if prices rather than quantities are chosen. However, generalizing the analysis to a di¤erent
class of demand function may require the use of numerical rather than analytical methods.
In the present paper, we have restricted our analysis to an ex ante symmetric environ-
ment. We have shown that the resulting outcome may be ex post asmmetric. It would be
another interesting direction to analyze an ex ante asymmetric environment where one rm
has access to more precise information or enjoys a superior technology.
2.6 CONCLUSION
We have developed a simple two stage model of strategic network formation in order to
analyze the incentive of rms to share information in an oligopolistic market where rms face
an uncertain demand. Before rms observe a private signal they decide whether to form links
to other rms in order to exchange information on market situation. After link formation
each rm observes its own private signal, and then they transmit their private information to
the linked rms simultaneously. After the network formation and information transmission
stage, the rm chooses its level of output. Our interest has been in the interaction between
the incentives of rms to collaborate for information sharing (and the resulting network
structure) and the market uncertainty. We have derived pure strategy mixed cooperative
and noncooperative equilibria that are subgame perfect and stable, and characterized the
resulting graphs.
Our analysis has attempted to clarify the nature of collaboration structures that are sta-
ble under market uncertainties and di¤erent scopes of cooperation or coordination among the
oligopolistic rms in the market. An important nding is that even in the setting where rms
face an unknown common demand, complete information sharing, no information sharing,
and partial-asymmetric information sharing emerge as subgame perfect and pairwise stable
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equilibrium outcomes under Cournot competition, if rms make a pairwise decision in the
decentralized environment. This result contrasts with the existing literature on centralized
information sharing. The result is both interesting and important, since pairwise stabil-
ity captures a relevant and natural equilibrium state in the analysis of the decentralized
oligopolistic market. Finally, the unique strongly stable equilibrium outcome involves no in-
formation sharing and the resulting empty network. This illustrates that information sharing
among rms facing an uncertatin environment critically depends on the coaltion structure.
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3.0 A WAR OF ATTRITION IN NETWORK FORMATION
3.1 MOTIVATION
"    the individual, when isolated, is not self-su¢ cing; and therefore he is like a part
in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need
because he is su¢ cient for himself, must be either a beast or a god    "
(Aristotle, "Politics")
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategic behavior of agents when they face
a decision on the formation of relationships. Networks of relationships play a critical role in
the wide set of economic and social situations. For instance, personal contacts play impor-
tant roles in obtaining information about job opportunities. Such networks of relationships
also underlie the trade and exchange of goods in non-centralized markets, the provision of
mutual insurance in developing countries, R&D and collusive alliances among corporations,
and international alliances and trade agreements.1 Given the prevalence and importance
of network structures, the literature on the formation of networks among agents addresses
various questions: Some examples are how such network structures are important in deter-
mining the outcome of economic interaction, how we predict which networks are likely to
form when agents have the strategic discretion to choose their connections, and how e¢ -
cient the networks are. These are fundamentally and theoretically important, but there still
remain essential questions to be addressed: who initiates the link of relationship and pays
for it, and what behaviors agents show in the process. The current paper addresses these
1Refer to Jackson (2004) for an excellent survey.
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questions, as well as the traditional questions specied above. For this purpose, we consider
a somewhat specic situation where links or relationships among agents have characteristics
of public goods.
Public goods and activities give a positive value to everyone, but their cost is borne
entirely by the individual agent performing them. Therefore everyone has strong incentives
to free ride by letting someone else do it. Many researchers have shown that this kind of
economic environment is well described and analyzed by applying a war of attrition among
agents. (See, Bilodeau, M. and Slivinski, A. (1996) and Bliss, C and Nalebu¤, B (1984)).
Many social and economic relationships that benet both the corresponding parties are ef-
ciently established by the e¤ort of a single initiative party. Inviting new neighbors for a
dinner and links between politicians and businessmen can be examples. Under this consid-
eration, we observe that links among economic agents in Bala and Goyals (2000) two-way
ow model have such properties of public goods among linked agents. Once relationships are
established by someone, others can use this network of relationships freely as long as they
are parts of the given network. However, the costs of link formation are incurred only by the
agents who initiate the links. So each agent strongly wants to wait for the others to initiate
a link to him. This kind of a waiting situation allows us to analyze network formation in the
framework of a war of attrition where the strategy of an agent is the specication of the set
of waiting times among agents with whom he plays the game. The main goal of this paper
is to understand how and which network structures emerge as equilibrium outcomes when
links among agents have such properties of a public good and all agents want to wait. Also
we investigate who volunteers to initiate the link and pays for link formation in the network
formation process, and who would be a center if the star network is formed.
There are many other papers that provide theoretical models of network formation in
strategic contexts. This paper is related to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in that we pursue
the same questions they seriously began to ask. Both studies examine the incentive and the
behavior of agents to form a link and characterize the resulting equilibrium structures and
their e¢ ciency. While Jackson and Wolinskys (1996) analysis depends on the cooperative
and static model, we choose the noncooperative and dynamic approach. By being coop-
erativewe mean that there needs to be mutual agreement of two corresponding agents to
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form a link, while by noncooperativewe mean that the link can be formed and severed
unilaterally and the cost of link formation is incurred only by the agent who initiates the
link. Jackson and Watts (2002) and Watts (2001) develop Jackson and Wolinskys (1996)
model into the dynamic network formation situation. In particular, Jackson and Watts
(2002) studies the stochastic evolution of networks where agents occasionally form or delete
links by mistake, thus they characterized the set of stochastically stable networks as limiting
networks. However, our model is noncooperative, applies a war of attrition between agents
to dynamic network formation, and excludes the possibility of mistakes. This paper is most
closely related to the Bala and Goyals (2000) noncooperative model in which individual
agents can unilaterally form new links and sever the existing links. The possibility of uni-
lateral link formation is quite important in methodology because this allows us to use Nash
equilibrium concept in the network formation game unlike the other papers which use the
concept of pairwise stablity or strongly stability. Although their model is basically static,
Bala and Goyal (2000) also examine a repeated game which focuses on myopic agentslearn-
ing as a way to identify equilibria. They study both one-way and two-way ow of benets
(or information). We are especially interested in the two-way ow model where benets are
nonrival and nonexcludable and costs are incurred only by the one who forms a link.
The main contribution of this paper is in the modeling and analysis of the network
formation in the context of the war of attrition among agents. Much of the previous literature
implicily assumes a bargaining process between corresponding agents. It is a natural human
behavior to free ride to enjoy as much utility as they could. It becomes clear the link has
properties of public goods. Hence it is plausible to apply a war of attrition to network
formation process in order to understand how agents behave when they face a free-riding
situation and they have an option to wait. An analysis of this scenario must ask and
answer to two simple questions: who wins the waiting game and when does the war of
attrition end? We address these questions by deriving a unique equilibrium outcome. The
second contribution is in overcoming the coordination problem. The existing literature on
the formation of networks including the above papers focuses on the architecture of the
equilibrium outcome and discuss the interaction between e¢ ciency and stability. Of course,
these questions are fundamental and important. However most of them su¤er from the
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multiplicity of equilibria. Some avoid this problem by choosing the cooperative approach
and others are silent at this trivially by adopting the symmetry assumption. Bala and Goyals
(2000) noncooperative model has only two nonempty network structures that are strict Nash
equilibria. These are the circle network in the one-way ow model and the center-sponsored
star network in the two-way ow model. If the benet (or information) ows both ways
through the link, the center-sponsored star is the unique nonempty strict Nash Equilibrium
structure. Note that the center-sponsored star network is an asymmetric equilibrium, while
the circle is a symmetric equilibrium where every agent chooses the same action. This raises
a question of who initiates the links, pays for link formation, and who should be the center
if the asymmetric star network is formed. We can analyze such a coordination problem
although the analysis is conducted in the restricted environment. The third contribution
is in the introduction of heterogeneity of agents to the network formation literature. The
heterogeneity assumption is reasonable even in the network formation settings, and this
assumption greatly helps to resolve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria.
Our results are as follows. We nd that in each subgame the agent with the higher value
of benet-cost ratio forms a link immediately. Unlike the results of Bala and Goyals (2000)
two-way ow model in which either the center-sponsored star or the empty network is the
strict Nash equilibrium, we show that as the set of agents grows bigger, a variety of the equi-
librium structures which are minimally connected spanning trees emerge as subgame-perfect
equilibrium structures. And we demonstrate that these equilibrium outcomes are usually
ine¢ cient. Also we observe that the cost payment for link formation does not depend on
whether the agent is the central one or not even when star network emerges as an equilibrium
outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of
a war of attrition in network formation context, which allows for a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic network formation game as a nitely
repeated war of attrition, characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium structures and their
welfare implications. We provide a simple example in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 THE STAGE GAME: A WAR OF ATTRITION
Consider a two-agent version of the war of attrition which will arise as a subgame of the
dynamic game. Let two typical agents be i and j. We assume each agent possesses some
information which the other can use via the formation of costly link. Let bi 2 B; 8 i;
denote the utility ow of agent is information to himself and the other agent. We assume
information (or benet) ows both ways. Suppose that until the link is formed, agent i gets
utility bi, and that once the link is formed to agent j, his utility ow from that time forward
is bi + bj. We let Ci > 0 be the present discounted net cost to agent i if he forms the link.
Agent i discounts the future utility at rate i. We assume without loss of generality that
Ci < bi = i for all i. Assume also that every agents cost, benet, and the discount rate
are common knowledge. We add a dynamic element by allowing individuals the possibility
of waiting for some time before volunteering. The point of waiting is to let someone else
volunteer rst, but waiting can be costly because until someone performs the service, no one
can enjoy its benets.
In the reduced strategic form of this kind of waiting game, a pure strategy is a time
t 2 [0;1) at which to volunteer if no one else has. Once anyone volunteers, the link is
formed and the game ends. In the extensive form, a strategy must specify whether an agent
would volunteer at any t in the eventuality that no one had volunteered up to that point.
In particular, strategies must specify what an agent would do even at times that would be
reached with probability zero given the others strategy. For example, if someone volunteers
with probability one at t = 0, strategies must specify what the other would do if any t > 0
is reached. Now, if the link is formed by the other agent at time t, agent is payo¤ would be
Fi(t) =
bi
i
+
bj
i
e it.
Suppose that the cost of forming a link includes two separate components: a one-time
utility cost fi, and a net utility ow of cost ci. The total cost of volunteering at time t is
therefore
Ci(t) = fie
 it +
ci
i
e it.
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Readers might be uncomfortable with the assumption that the initiator pays all link
costs and that both agents benet from the link, since many examples of two-way ow
networks have two-sided link costs (such as social or friendship networks) whereas one-sided
link costs are often associated with one-way ow networks (such as visiting a website and
downloading a paper). However, the existence of the net utility ow of cost, ci, is not
essential. What is important is that there must exist at least a one-time utility cost, fi, to
initiate the relationship among strangers. Inviting newly arrived neighbors to dinner can be
an example. By adding the continuous maintenance cost, we try to capture the idea that
the initiator usually pays more attention to maintenance of the relationship or has slightly
higher start-up costs.
Assume that bj   ci   ifi > 0 for all i, so everyone would still rather form a link than
do completely without it. Let Li(t) = Fi(t)  Ci(t) denote the payo¤ to i if he is the one to
volunteer to form a link at time t, and let Si(t) be is payo¤ if he volunteers simultaneously
with the other, where Li(t)  Si(t) < Fi(t). Then Si = limLi(t) = limFi(t) = bi = i is his
payo¤ if no one ever volunteers.
Hendricks et al. (1988) provide a complete characterization of all the subgame-perfect
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equilibria for this class of games. Using their results, we can construct the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 10. There is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in which anyone of the
two agents establishes a link immediately.
Proof. Li(0) > Si for all t and Li(0)  Fi(t) for some t 2 [0;1) by assumption, so condition
(b) (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 of Hendricks et al. (1988) are satised. Therefore there is
an equilibrium where someone forms a link immediately with probability one and the other
waits with probability one. And there is no t for which Li(t) < Si for some i, and Li(0) > Si
for all i, so condition (b) of Theorem 4 of Hendricks et al. (1988) is satised. Therefore
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which any of the two players establishes a link
immediately with probability one.
Intuitively speaking, since Li(0) > Si, an agent is always better o¤ forming a link imme-
diately than doing completely without it if no one else volunteers. So suppose no one else
ever volunteers, then it is optimal for i to volunteer immediately, and since i volunteers im-
mediately, no one else can do better by changing their strategy. Verifying subgame-perfection
requires dening strategies for the extensive form game. If agent j adopts the strategy of
waiting forever, then the best agent i can do is to form a link with probability one if any
t is ever reached. Given the strategy of agent i, agent j has no incentive to change his
strategy. So this constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Therefore, in our setting the
empty network does not emerge as a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome.
The classic war of attrition exhibits multiple equilibria. Many papers show that the
"perturbed" version of a war of attrition exhibits a unique equilibrium. Exit failures, hybrid
all-pay auctions and time limits all represent perturbations to the war of attrition. In the
present paper, in order to avoid the presence of multiple equilibria, we impose a common
time limit T and this yields a nite-horizon war of attrition.2 Allowing T ! 1 eliminates
the perturbation. Lets consider the game in which agents have a nite time horizon T .
2We nd that in a very general complete information game, multiplicity of equilibria depends crucially on
the assumption that agents have an innite horizon. If we assume instead that agents have a nite horizon,
the game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. This remains true even when the time horizon
tends to innity. Since the innite horizon game is the limit of the set of nite horizon games, this outcome
stands out even in innite horizon games.
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Then the relevant payo¤s become
Fi(t) =
bi
i
(1  e iT ) + bj
i
(e it   e iT ) (3.1)
Ci(t) = fie
 it +
ci
i
(e it   e iT ) (3.2)
Li(t) = Fi(t)  fie it   ci
i
(e it   e iT ) (3.3)
and, Si =
bi
i
(1  e iT ) (3.4)
Then there exists a t^i < T such that Li(t)  Si for all t  t^i and Li(t) < Si for all t > t^i .
When agents have a nite horizon, there exists a point in time, t^i for each i, when it is
no longer worth forming a link because the benets will be felt for only a short time after.
Beyond that point, it is a dominant strategy for agent i to never volunteer. Solving for the
t^i for which Li(t) = Si we nd
t^i = T  
1
i
ln(
bj   ci
bj   ci   ifi
): (3.5)
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Proposition 11. Generically, when both the agents have a nite horizon, the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium outcome is where the agent with the larger value of t^i establishes a link
immediately.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose t^i > t
^
j . No one will form a link at any time t > t
^
i .
At any t 2 (t^j ; t^i ] player i can deduce that j will never volunteer. But since Li(t)  Si(T ),
8 t 2 (t^j ; t^i ), is subgame-perfect strategy must be to form a link if any such t is reached.
Now consider any time t 2 (t^j   "; t^j ]. Both i and j might volunteer, but j will prefer to
wait for i to volunteer at t^j . Then in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, i must volunteer at
any t 2 (t^j   "; t^j). We, then, analyze at any t 2 (t^j   2"; t^j   "], t 2 (t^j   3"; t^j   2"], and so
on. By backward induction, the subgame-perfect equilibria are where player i forms a link
at any t 2 [0; t^i ), randomizes between voluntary link formation and waiting at t = t^i , and
never forms a link at any t > t^i , and player j always waits.
Therefore, we observe that the subgame-perfect outcome is where the agent with larger
benet/cost ratio forms the link immediately. This implies that, if all other parameters were
identical across the agents, the agent with the lowest cost, the agent with the highest gain,
or the most impatient agent volunteers immediately.
3.3 THE SEQUENTIAL NETWORK FORMATION GAME
Now we embed the stage game of the two-agent version of a war of attrition into the dynamic
network formation game. Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng be the nite set of risk-neutral agents and
let i and j be typical members of the set. At each stage, two agents are randomly drawn from
the set N, and each of these paired agents plays a war of attrition to free ride by waiting as
in the previous section. If the same couple appears repeatedly, the game ends immediately
and two new agents are drawn.3 Time is continuous and each stage game has a common
time limit T . If nobody volunteers to form a link within time limit T , the stage game ends
and the newly matched agents play the dened game in the subsequent stage. After each
3The number of the stage games in the whole game is
 
N
2

. In this sense, the matching protocol is random
permutation. For example, when N = 3, the number of the stage games in the whole game is three and a
sequence ((1,2)-(2,3)-(1,3)) is one possible realization.
41
stage game, the resulting relationships among agents are represented by graphs whose nodes
are identied with agents and whose links capture the pairwise relations.
Suppose agents i and j are matched at stage  . We denote this by (i; j) . Let g =
(gij; g

ji) where g

ij 2 f0; 1g. We say agent i (j) initiates a link (also pays the cost for it) to
agent j (i) at stage  if gij = 1 (g

ji = 1). With two-way ow assumption, the link g

ij = 1
enables both i and j to access each others information. Let t = (ti ; t

j ) where t

i 2 [0; T ]
denotes the waiting time before agent i initiates a link to j at stage  . We say agent i forms
a link immediately at stage  if ti = 0, and agent i never forms a link or never volunteers to
form a link at stage  if ti = T . A history h
 = (h0; ((j; k)1; g1; t1); : : : ; ((j; k) 1; g 1; t 1))
begins with the null history and further records for each of the rst    1 stages. Denote
by H the set of all such histories and dene H =
S
=1H
 . We call g(h ) =
S
=1 g
 the
existing graph at stage  . We will denote g(h ) as g whenever convenient. The set of all
possible graphs on N is denoted by G.
Consider newly matched agents i and j at stage  . If there is a linked path between
them and if there is no decay in information (benets) transmission, they consent to end the
stage game immediately since this causes cost only. Otherwise, given the graph structure
at the beginning of stage  , they calculate the benet and cost of the link formation. Let
bi(g) denote the utility ow from that time forward by constructing a link to i at period  .
For instance, if agents 1, 2, and 3 are linked anyhow and if there is no decay then agent i
can enjoy utility ow from that time forward by forming a link to agent 1 by b1(g) = b1+
b2 + b3. The costs of link formation are incurred only by the agent who initiates the link.
Let Ci > 0 be the present discounted net cost to agent i if he forms the link. This consists
of two parts: a one-time utility cost fi and a net utility ow of cost ci. Each agent can sever
the existing link unilaterally at any time without any cost. Recall that the game is played
noncooperatively. The game is a complete information game where everyones informational
value, cost of link formation, and discount rate are common knowledge. Then the relevant
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payo¤ structure facing agent i at period  becomes
F i (t; g) =
bi(g)
i
(1  e iT ) + bj(g)
i
(e it

j   e iT ) (3.6)
Ci (t) = fie
 iti +
ci
i
(e it

i   e iT ) (3.7)
Li (t; g) = Fi(t; g)  fie it

i   ci
i
(e it

i   e iT ) (3.8)
and, Si =
bi(g)
i
(1  e iT ) (3.9)
When agents have a nite horizon, there exists a point in time, t^i (g) for each i, when
it is no longer worth forming a link, as T is large enough so that the benets will be felt
for only a short time after. Beyond that point, it is a dominant strategy for the player i to
never volunteer. Solving for the t^i (g) for which L

i (t; g) = S

i we nd
t^i (g) = T  
1
i
ln(
bj(g)  ci
bj(g)  ci   ifi
): (3.10)
Note that link formation is immediate among agents on the equilibrium path. Therefore
agentspayo¤s and total welfare depend only on the resulting graphs in equilibrium. Recall
that the empty network does not emerge as a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. Suppose
there has been no link before the last stage game starts. As is studied in the previous section,
it is a subgame-perfect outcome that one of the two players forms a link immediately in last
stage game. Therefore, the empty network does not appear as the subgame-perfect structure.
Proposition 12. In each subgame, when both the agents have a nite horizon, the agent
with the larger value of t^i (g) establishes a link immediately.
We characterize the structures of the equilibrium outcomes and their properties.
Corollary 13. 1. When T is large enough, minimally connected spanning trees emerge as
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes if there is no decay in information (benet) transmis-
sion, and the complete network emerges as subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome if there is
no spillovers.
2. Star networks, which crucially depend on the sequence of the matching, are just a subset
of the possible subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, cost payment does not
depend on whether agent is the center or not even if star networks emerge.
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Proof. Recall that the empty network does not emerge as a subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome. And note that there are at most (N   1) links in the resulting graph if g is
connected. If g is not minimally connected, there exists an agent who can delete a link
and still have a path with every other agent, so g is not subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
outcome. Suppose that g is a nonempty subgame-perfect Nash network, and suppose it is
not connected. Since g is nonempty there exists a component g(C) such that jg(C)j  2.
Choose i 2 g(C). As g is not connected, there exists j 2 N such that j =2 g(C). Case (1):
If j is an isolated agent, then the payo¤ to agent j from a link with i is bigger than present
payo¤, which violates the hypothesis that agent j is choosing a best response at every stage
game. Suppose, at stage  , agent j meets agent i 2 g(C). Suppose that t^i < t^j . (This is
true since, if j forms a link to i, he can use all benets from the component g(C) 3 i. If
t^i > t
^
j , then is problem belongs to Case (2) to be analyzed later). The only reason, player
i must expect, for not forming a link is that there appears an agent k =2 g(C) who will form
a link to j rst and then to one member of g(C). (If k =2 g(C) forms a link to an existing
component g(C) rst, then problem returns to original situation). Even if the expectation
that k will form a link to j is correct (now j is not an isolated agent), we can show that js
waiting is not best response. Case (2): Suppose instead that j lies in another component
g(D) where jg(D)j  2. Suppose, at stage  , agents i and j are drawn. Suppose, without
loss of generality, that jg(C)j  jg(D)j and t^i < t^j . If the matching is the last ordered
one, the player with bigger t^, j, will form a link immediately. Now suppose that there
is a positive probability that agents i 2 g(C) and k 2 g(D) will meet each other at stage
 + 1. For the strong result, assume that agents i and k meet with probability one. In this
situation, player j has a strong incentive to wait even if t^i < t
^
j , not because he expects i to
initiate the link, but because he waits for player k to form a link to i at the stage  + 1 at
the cost of non-accessibility to benets of component g(C) during time T . But we can nd
that, when T is large enough, js immediate link formation incurring the cost is benecial
to both of them. This contradiction implies that g is connected. Therefore, g is minimally
connected.
Note that t^ is determined endogenously through the link formation process. Informally
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we can describe the network formation process as follows. When the rst two players meet
each other in the rst stage, they play a war of attrition to free ride, and one of the two
players with the higher t^i forms a link immediately. Then there are two subcases in the next
stage. One is the matching of two isolated players. This is the same as the rst matching
of the game. The other subcase is the matching where one of the two players has been
linked from the previous stage and the other one is an isolated player. In this case it is very
probable that the isolated player has the higher t^i and, therefore, forms a link immediately
to the other player because he can enjoy all informational value of the existing component
where the opponent player is included. This process continues until the minimally spanning
tree completes.
Usually these equilibrium outcomes are ine¢ cient. The e¢ cient network structure in our
setting that gives the highest welfare is the center-sponsored star network in which only the
agent with the lowest link formation cost plays the central node. But this is just a special
case of the minimum spanning tree. The example below illustrates how the players behave,
how and which network structure arise in equilibrium. Also this example shows how hard it
is for the e¢ cient outcome to appear in our model.
3.4 AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate ideas presented in the previous sectoins, consider the following example. Assume
that N = f1; 2; 3g, T = 10,
b1 = 4; c1 = 1; f1 = 2; 1 = 0:5;
b2 = 4; c2 = 1:5; f2 = 2; 2 = 0:5;
b3 = 5; c3 = 1:5; f3 = 2; 3 = 1.
Assume that information (benet) ows both ways and there is no decay in information
transmission (i.e., complete spillovers). In the example the sequence of matching is a random
permutation among f(1; 2); (2; 3); (1; 3)g. Suppose that the rst matched pair is (1; 2). Then
the order of the matching is ((1; 2); (1; 3); (2; 3)) with probability .5 (say, Game A) and
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(1,3)
(2,3)
(2,3)
(1,3)
(1,2)
Stage 3Stage 2Stage 1
Figure 7: The matching sequence of the game
((1; 2); (2; 3); (1; 3)) with probability .5 (say, Game B). Figure 7 shows the sequence of the
game. Here each node represents the stage game (the two-agent version of a war of attrition)
between the two corresponding agents. In each stage game both the agents try to free ride
by letting the other initiate a link and start waiting.
Note that if two links were already formed in the previous stages, the last matched pair
has no incentive to form a link, because it causes only cost without additional benet. So
they do not volunteer at all in their meeting, and the game ends. If one link was formed in the
previous stages, one of the two agents in the last stage game will form a link immediately.
Therefore, in case of three agent network formation game, the outcome structure has at
most two links under our assumptions. Note also that if the best choice for an agent is to
volunteer, then he will volunteer as soon as possible, because waiting is also costly. For an
easy explanation, we use another tree. Figure 8 shows only Game A which has the sequence
((1; 2); (1; 3); (2; 3)), and each node represents the stage game between the two randomly
chosen agents. Figure 8 shows subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in Game A in which
the number indicates the agent who (immediately) initiates a link and pays for the link in
each stage game, and x means nobody volunteers to form a link. For instance, consider
the rst stage of the game played between agents 1 and 2. There are only three possible
46
x31x31
33 2 3 x
x31
x21
(2,3)(2,3)
(1,3)(1,3)(1,3)
(1,2)Stage 1:
Stage 2:
Stage 3:
Figure 8: Game A
outcomes. One possible subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is where agent 1 volunteers
immediately, the other is where agent 2 does, and the last case is where nobody volunteers.
This applies to every other stage game (node). It is important to remember that each stage
game has only three possible subgame-equilibrium outcomes where one of the two agents
immediately form a link when they are not linked, or nobody forms a link. Recall that we
consider the no decay case only.
Since agents observe the actions of the other agents and the resulting graph among them
in each stage, they can calculate their expected payo¤s from voluntary link formation and
their t^i (g) before choosing their actions. We know that in each stage game the agent with
higher t^i (g) forms a link immediately. We apply backward induction to nd out the subgame-
perfect equilibrium outcome. Arrows in Figure 8 indicate the nal equilibrium outcome.
Consider the third stage of the game played between agents 2 and 3. If two links are formed
at the previous stages, they dont move. Given that there is a link formed at the rst stage
and no link at the second stage, for agent 3, forming a link to agent 2 causes additional utility
ow b1 + b2 at the cost of C3, while, for agent 2, establishing a link gives additional utility
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ow b3 and the cost C2. This consideration gives t^(g) = (t^2(g); t
^
3(g)) = (9:3271; 9:6323).
Therefore agent 3 forms a link immediately at the third stage. We can examine the other
nodes (stage games) using the same reasoning. Lets consider agent 3 in the second stage.
Agent 3 will again form a link immediately if there is a link between agents 1 and 2 at the
rst stage, since agent 3 knows that he should form a link at the third stage otherwise. If
there is no link at the rst stage, agents 1 and 2 will form a link at the second and third
stage respectively in Game A. Now consider the rst stage of the game. Agents 1 and 2
know that either Game A or Game B will be played with even probability after their play.
Then they estimate the expected benets and costs by applying backward induction and
they get t^(g(h0)) = (t^1(g); t
^
2(g)) = (9:5987; 9:5538). Therefore agent 1 forms a link to
agent 2 immediately. Now we need to check whether agents 1 and 3 at the second stage
have any incentive to change their actions after they observe the rst stage game between
agents 1 and 2. As soon as they observe that agent 1 formed the link to agent 2 at the
rst stage, agent 3 will immediately establish a link to agent 1 in order to enjoy increased
benets of agents 1 and 2. This constitutes subgame-perfection. The resulting architecture
of the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is minimally connected spanning tree.4 Figure
9 shows the resulting graphs. X indicates that the agent closer to X is the one who initiates
the link and pays for it.
We have analyzed only a part of the whole game where the rst matching is (1; 2). This
means that we will have the resulting graphs shown above with probability 1=3. Although
this is very simple example, we can nd important implications. First, we can characterize
the equilibrium network structures. In this example, since we have only 3 agents, the struc-
ture can be a star or a line. We can, in general, say that the equilibrium outcome is minimally
connected spanning tree. We easily check that two resulting networks are ine¢ cient. The
only e¢ cient graph in our example is the star network in which agent 1 initiates all links.
Second, we show explicitly who initiates the link, who pays for the link formation, and who
should be the central agent if the star network emerges as an equilibrium outcome. We nd
4If there is no spillover in information transmission, i.e., if agents can enjoy the benet of link formation
from the directly linked partners only, the resulting graphs would be the complete networs as long as there
is the higher benet than the cost from the link formation. However, the payment structures are di¤erent
from each other.
48
32
1
Game A
32
1
Game B
Figure 9: The resulting graphs
there is no relationship between being a central agent and paying the cost. In Game B two
peripheral agents form the links and pay for them, while in Game A one link is initiated by
the central agent and the other is by peripheral agent. Furthermore, we illustrate that the
sequence of the matching plays a critical role in our dynamic model. As shown above, the
unique resulting graph critically depends on the matching sequence. Watts (2002) also men-
tion this observation. Watts (2002) says that, even though their approach is cooperative one,
the only way for the star network to form is if the agents meet in a particular pattern. For
N = 4; a star will form if agents meet in the order f(1; 2); (1; 3); (1; 4); (2; 3); (2; 4); (3; 4)g,
but not if the agents meet in the order f(1; 2); (3; 4); (1; 3); (1; 4); (2; 3); (2; 4)g. We also ob-
serve the same phenomenon. If the benets and costs are very similar each other and if
the sequence of matching is given as f(1; 2); (1; 3); (1; 4); (2; 3); (2; 4); (3; 4)g, then periphery-
sponsored star network with agent 1 being the center can appear as a resulting graph but not
with the sequence f(1; 2); (3; 4); (1; 3); (1; 4); (2; 3); (2; 4)g. The agent associated with many
links (i.e., the agent with high degree) is the one who moves many times in earlier stages
than others. When N = 3, the central agent is always the one who moves rst two stages
in a row. When N = 4, it is necessary that the central one must be drawn rst three times
in a row. Here we conclude that the important role of the matching sequence is a common
property of sequential network formation.
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3.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper has tried to understand how economic agents behave and which network struc-
tures emerge depending on the behaviors of agents when the links among agents have the
properties of the public goods. It is well studied that network structures play a signicant
role in determining the outcome of many important economic relationships. Therefore it
is crucial to know how network congurations arise and which network structures emerge.
There, however, still remain important questions to be addressed: Who will volunteer to
initiate relationships that everyone would rather let someone else do? What will be the re-
sulting network structure in this situation? To answer to these questions, we have modelled
the search for a volunteer as a war of attrition in which everyone is tempted to just wait for
someone else to do it.
The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the dynamic network formation
game is that in each stage, ceteris paribus, the agent with the higher benet/cost ratio
of performing the link, or the agent with higer impatience establishes a link immediately.
Unlike the results of Bala and Goyal (2000) in which either the center-sponsored star or
the empty network is the strict Nash equilibrium outcome, we show that as the set of the
players grows bigger, a variety of the equilibrium structures which are minimally connected
spanning trees can emerge as subgame-perfect equilibrium structures. And we demonstrate
that these equilibrium outcomes are usually ine¢ cient. Also we observe that cost payment
for link formation does not depend on whether the agent is the central one or not, even if
star networks happen.
In this paper we have applied the war of attrition as a specic behavior among agents
in the network formation. We can think of alternative network formation processes such
as a bargaining among agents. It would be an interesting question to ask what happens
if agents use bargaining process in the network formation. And it would not be a trivial
topic to compare the resulting equilibrium outcomes and their welfare implications. One
natural extension would be to introduce uncertainty to the model. This paper assumes
complete information, which is perhaps unrealistic. If agents have private information on
link formation cost or discount factor, we might not have the result of immediate network
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construction result. Finally, it would be interesting to incorporate the endogenous matching
process into the model. We leave these extensions to future research. to the question of
whether Folk Theorem is applicable in this setting.
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4.0 SOCIAL NORMS AND TRUST AMONG STRANGERS
4.1 MOTIVATION
One of the most important issues in economics is how to sustain cooperative equilibrium
when players have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. The trust game illustrates this
situation well. An investor has the option of choosing a costly trusting action by giving
money to a trustee. The trustee is then informed of the investors transfer and can honor
the investors trust by sharing the monetary payo¤ generated by the investors transfer. If
the investor gives money to the trustee and the latter shares the proceeds of the investment,
both players end up with a higher monetary payo¤. However, the trustee also has the option
of violating the investors trust. As sharing the proceeds is costly for the trustee, a selsh
trustee will never honor the investors trust because the investor and the trustee interact only
once. The investor is therefore caught in a dilemma: if she trusts and the trustee shares, the
investor increases her payo¤, but she is also subject to the risk that the trustee will abuse
this trust. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is not to trust and not to
reciprocate. This game well describes a credit market and the typical transactions between
buyers and sellers based on trust in cyberspace.
Economists have long recognized reputationas an e¤ective means of enforcing cooper-
ative behavior when there exists an institution to track and disseminate such information, or
within a small group where people are intimately familiar with one anothers history. These
personal enforcement mechanisms are e¤ective only if quick and substantial retaliations are
available. The Folk Theorem in the repeated game literature (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986)
provides a formal model of personal enforcement, showing that any mutually benecial out-
come can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if the same set of players plays the
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same stage game ad innitum.
However, many important transactions in reality are infrequent in nature and many
transactions happen among essentially anonymous players. eBay claims more than 100
million registered users who buy and sell millions of item each day on the internet. These
transactions are done between strangers who have no contact except through cyberspace.
In this case only partial information about a strangers reputation is available at best, and,
therefore, the e¤ectiveness of reputation is far less certain. This observation raises important
question about economic behavior. What factors drive the emergence of trust and reciprocity
in economic transactions? In order to analyze this question, previous papers consider a
random matching model under the most extreme information restriction.
Kandori (1992) analyzes the special economic environment where a deviating agent can-
not be directly punished since each agent is anonymous and interacts only at randomly
determined times with any other particular agent in the population. Nevertheless, a devia-
tor could be indirectly punished if the deviation were to trigger a contagious reaction that
destroyed the social norm of cooperation. If the consequences of the eventual destruction
of the norm were su¢ ciently severe, and if the threat of such a contagious reaction were
credible, then the threat might sustain a social norm of cooperation. Kandori (1992) shows
that there exist conditions that make such a threat credible in the innitely repeated pris-
oners dilemma with a random matching. Specically, for any xed population size, Kandori
provides an example of a game in which cooperative repeated game equilibria exist, showing
that we can dene payo¤s for the prisoners dilemma which allow cooperation in a sequential
equilibrium. However, when the population is large the argument applies only to games with
extreme payo¤s.
Ellison (1994), based on Kandoris model, analyzes two main problems. First, he asks
whether cooperation is possible in a sequential equilibrium for general payo¤s in the pris-
oners dilemma. He reaches the positive answer by introducing a publicly observable random
variable. Public randomization devices adjust the expected duration, and hence the severity
of the punishment. The second problem is a study of the stability and e¢ ciency of the equi-
librium in a world with noise. Kandori observed that a single deviation leads to a complete
destruction of cooperation due to the property of contagious reaction. With public random-
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izations, global stability1 described by Kandori (1992) is easily achieved. Another problem
happens in terms of e¢ ciency. If we have a globally stable equilibrium where the continua-
tion payo¤s return to the cooperative level so slowly so that the equilibrium with noise has
an expected payo¤ near zero, stability is not plausible. However, this problem is very hard
to overcome. If one player were a "crazy" type and always played the Defect action, the
contagious strategies would not support cooperative equilibrium. In a large population, we
may want to allow for heterogeneity among players, and the existence of the crazy type may
be more appropriate.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we theoretically extend Kandoris (1992)
arguments to the trust game. As Ellison (1994) notes, the results of the previous papers
heavily rely on the fact that the prisoners dilemma has a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Therefore it would be interesting to know whether the results extend to the other class of
games. Kandori (1992) only shows that, under local information processing2, a simple form
of community enforcement supports cooperation in the one-sided incentive problem3. In
this paper, we consider the one-sided incentive problem under the most extreme information
restriction. That is, players are completely anonymous in that they can neither recognize nor
communicate the identity of any of their past opponent. Therefore, players do not observe
the outcomes of games in which they are not involved. We, rst, develop the concept of
the contagious strategy following Kandori (1992), and we provide the su¢ cient conditions
that support the social norm of trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium. Then we
introduce public randomizations to discuss the problem of stability. Our theoretic results
show that the existence of a contagious equilibrium critically depends on the level of the
outside option for the investor, since high outside option represents the high level of threat
in our model.
Second, the results of this paper rationalize many experimental results which show the
signicant level of trust and reciprocity in the laboratory. Many experimental studies have
1Public randomizations are used as a coordination device so that all players can simultaneously return to
cooperation. Therefore, after any nite history, the continuation payo¤s of the players eventually return to
the cooperative level with probability one.
2Each player carries a label and the necessary information is transmitted by the players labels. After
actions, their labels are updated depending on their original labels and actions by a given rule. (Kandori,
1992)
3A canonical example of the one-side incentive problem is the trust game.
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used the trust game to identify trust and reciprocity in an investment setting, and found
that trust and reciprocity prevail in the laboratory even under the conditions of complete
anonymity and one-shot interaction. They regard these behaviors irrational and explain
them with some psychological factors such as fairness, altruism and inequality aversion etc.
Another contribution of this study is that we identify trusting and reciprocating behavior
as an equilibrium phenomenon without changing the fundamental assumption in economics
that individuals act in their own self interest. That is, we show that trust and reciprocity are
consistent with a rational choice of selsh players, and investigate how such a cooperative
social norm is sustained by self-interested group members in the community.
Finally, we expect that this study will help explain the emergence and prevalence of
e-Commerce which is important as the internet develops. The success of e-Commerce can
be seen as an equilibrium outcome (i.e., the establishment of the social norm of trust and
reciprocity) in the anonymous random matching model based on the social norms and com-
munity enforcement. More generally, an understanding of the factors that determine the
development of the social norm among strangers is of obvious importance to the design and
operation of economic transactions and economic institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal model of repeated
random matching game and exhibits a sequential equilibrium which sustains social norms of
trust and reciprocity. Section 3 introduces public randomizations and discuss the problem
of stability, and also shows that we can expand the set of equilibria which sustain trust and
reciprocity. Section 4 concludes and discusses the contributions.
4.2 THE MODEL WITHOUT PUBLIC RANDOMIZATION
In this section we describe the structure of the repeated matching game, dene the concept
of contagious equilibriumbased on Kandori (1992) in the innitely repeated trust game
with random matching, and then we present the conditions for the equilibrium to exist.
The set of players N = f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng is partitioned into two sets of equal size, the set
of investors NI = f1; 2; : : : ; ng and the set of trustees NT = fn + 1; n + 2; : : : ; 2ng. In each
period, each investor is matched with a trustee according to the uniform random matching
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Invest
ReturnNo Return
No Invest
a
0
0
1
b
1-b
Trustee
Figure 10: The trust game
rule, and they play the trust game as a stage game. This procedure is repeated innitely and
each players total payo¤ is the expected sum of his stage payo¤s discounted by  2 (0; 1).
In each period, every pair of investor and trustee play the trust game. At the beginning
of the game the investor is endowed with one unit of capital. In the rst stage, the investor
decides whether to invest the capital in the trustees business or not.4 If the investor decides
not to invest, the game ends and she gains a < 1 from the outside option and the trustee
gets nothing. If the investor chooses to invest, the capital grows into 1, the return from the
trustees business. In the second stage, the trustee decides whether to return nothing or to
return the amount b, where a < b < 1, to the investor. If the investor chooses to invest in
the rst stage and the trustee chooses to return in the second stage, the payo¤ is b for the
investor and 1 b for the trustee. If the investor chooses to invest but the trustee chooses not
to return, then the Investor gets nothing and the Trustee gets 1. We assume 0 < a < b < 1.
The trust game and its payo¤ structure is described in Figure 10.
If the game is played once, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the investor not
to invest in the rst stage and for the trustee not to return in the second stage. However,
4We will denote Investor as she and Trustee as he for clarity.
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since the return from capital in the trustees business is bigger than the outside option a of
the investor, the e¢ cient outcome is for the investor to invest and for the trustee to return.
Although the e¢ cient outcome can not be achieved in the one-shot trust game, we will
show below that it can be achieved in the contagious equilibriumwhen the trust game is
innitely repeated, even if the opponents are randomly rematched after each period.
We dene No Invest as the defection of an investor, and No Return as the defection of
a trustee. Dene d-type investors or trustees as those whose history include defection of
themselves or their partner, otherwise the players are c-type.
Denition 14. The contagious strategy is dened as follows: An investor invests if she
is c-type and does not invest if she is d-type. A trustee returns if he is c-type and does not
return if he is d-type.
The idea of the contagious strategy is that trust is applied to the community as a whole,
not to each individual player, since the players are anonymous. Therefore, a single defection
by a member means the end of the whole community trust, and a player who experiences
dishonest behavior starts defecting all of his or her opponents (Kandori, 1992). Now, we
provide an example in which cooperative game equilibria exist, showing that we can dene
payo¤s for the trust game which allow trust and reciprocity in a sequential equilibrium for
any xed number of population.
Theorem 15. Consider the random matching model described above where 2n  4 players
play a trust game. Then for any  and n, there exist a and b such that (i) 0 < a < b < 1; and
(ii) the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium in which (Invest, Return) is
the outcome in every period along the equilibrium path under uniformly random matching.
To prove Theorem 15, we rst introduce more notation. Let Xt be the total number of
d-type investors and Yt be the total number of d-type trustees at the beginning of period t.
Let Zt denote the state of period t. In particular, Zt is a one-to-one and onto function from
(Xt; Yt) to the set of natural numbers f1; 2;    ; n(n+ 2)g:
Zt = (n+ 1)Xt + Yt for Xt + Yt > 0:
Let A be an n(n+2)n(n+2) transition matrix with elements aij = PrfZt+1 = j j Zt =
ig. For example, a12 = PrfZt+1 = 2 j Zt = 1g = Prf(Xt+1; Yt+1) = (0; 2) j (Xt; Yt) = (0; 1)g.
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Similarly, let B be an n(n+ 2) n(n+ 2) transition matrix with elements bij = PrfZt+1 =
j j Zt = i and one d-type trustee deviates to Return}. Dene  as an n(n + 2)  1 column
vector with the ith element equal to the conditional probability for the trustee to meet a
c-type investor when the state is i in period t.5 Finally, let ei be a 1 n(n + 2) row vector
with the ith element equal to 1 and all other elements equal to 0.
Following Ellison (1994), we rst prove the following lemma, which is useful in proving
Theorem 15 and the results with public randomization in the next section.
Lemma 16. Dene f() = e1(B   A)(I   A) 1 and g() = en+2(B   A)(I   A) 1.
Then
(i) f() is continuous and increasing over  2 (0; 1), lim!0 f() = 0 and lim!1 f() = 1;
(ii) g() is continuous and increasing over  2 (0; 1), lim!0 g() = 0 and lim!1 g() < 1;
(iii) f() > g(), 8 2 (0; 1).
The lemma simply states that the benet for a d-type trustee to deviate on o¤-the-
equilibrium-path is larger when the state is k = 1 (i.e., there is no d-type investor and
one d-type trustee) than the benet when the state is k = n + 2 (i.e., there is one d-
type investor and one d-type trustee). The left hand side of the inequality can be written
into 
P1
t=0 
te1(B   A)At, which is the increase of payo¤s for the d-type trustee when
he chooses to deviate, given that there is no d-type investor and one d-type trustee in the
current period. Similarly, the right hand side can be written into 
P1
t=0 
ten+2(B  A)At,
which is the increase of payo¤s for the d-type trustee when he chooses to deviate, given that
there is one d-type investor and one d-type trustee in the current period.
Lemma 17. The contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium if
a  n  1
n
b; (4.1)
and
g()  b  f(): (4.2)
5The formulas for aij , bij ; and  can be found in Appendix A.
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Proof. As in Kandori (1992), we have only to check that one-shot deviations from the strategy
are unprotable after any history for both investors and trustees.
First, a one-shot deviation from the equilibrium path is unprotable for a trustee, if
(1  b)
1   
1X
t=0
te1A
t:
The left-hand side is the expected payo¤ from Return to the investor forever and the right-
hand side is the expected payo¤ from No Return forever. The expression e1At indicates the
distribution over all the possible states after t period and the term e1At is the probability
of meeting a c-type investor at time t given that the trustee was the rst to defect at t = 0.
Since the contagious equilibrium requires that the trustee should defect after he has defected,
he receives payo¤ c if he is matched with a c-type investor, and gets zero otherwise. This
inequality can be simplied to the inequality:
1  b  (1  )e1(I   A) 1 ( ? )
where I denotes the identity matrix with size n(n+ 2) n(n+ 2). Since
(1  )e1(I   A) 1+ e1(B   A)(I   A) 1
= e1(I   A) 1  e1A(I   A) 1
=
1X
t=0
te1A
t  
1X
t=0
t(e1A)A
t
= e1I = 1,
we can rewrite (?) as
b  e1(B   A)(I   A) 1:
Second, a one-shot deviation from the equilibrium path is unprotable for the investor if
b
1   
a
1   :
The left-hand side is the expected payo¤ for the investor from Invest forever and the right-
hand side is the expected payo¤ from No Invest forever. This condition is always satised
given that b > a.
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Next, we provide a su¢ cient condition for a one-shot deviation from an o¤-the-equilibrium-
path to be unprotable for the investor under any consistent belief, which supports the con-
tagious equilibrium as a sequential equilibrium. A d-type investor nds a one-shot deviation
from No Invest forever to be unprotable for any number of d-type trustees if
a
1   
n  l
n
b+ 
a
1   ; 8 l = 1; 2; : : : ; n
The left-hand side is the expected payo¤ from No Invest forever and the right-hand side is
the expected payo¤ from Invest in the current period and No Invest forever from the next
period. With probability (n  l)=n she meets a c-type trustee and gets b, or with probability
l=n she meets a d-type trustee and receive nothing in the current period. Since a d-type
investor has larger incentives to deviate (i.e., Invest) when the number of d-type trustees
is smaller in the society, the condition is binding when n = 1 and it can be simplied into
inequality (4.1).
Finally, a one-shot deviation from an o¤-the-equilibrium-path is unprotable for the
trustee under any consistent belief. Since there is at least one d-type investor and one d-type
trustee when the d-type trustee is currently on o¤-the-equilibrium-path, any consistent belief
for the state k < n + 2 must be zero. A d-type trustee nds a one-shot deviation from No
Return forever to be unprotable given Zt = k, for all k = n+ 2; : : : ; n(n+ 2), if
1 +
1X
t=1
tekA
t  (1  b) + 
1X
t=0
tekBA
t:
The left-hand side is the expected payo¤ from No Return forever and the right-hand side is
the expected payo¤ from Return in the current period and No Return forever from the next
period. The condition is based on the assumption that the trustee meets a c-type investor
in the current period, otherwise the stage game is over and the trustee neednt make any
decision. Recall that the term ekAt is the probability of meeting a c-type investor after t
periods given that the current state is Zt = k. The inequality can be simplied into
b  ek(B   A)(I   A) 1 for k = n+ 2; : : : ; n(n+ 2):
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This condition is binding when k = n + 2. Therefore it su¢ ces to show the following
inequality is satised
b  en+2(B   A)(I   A) 1.
By Lemma 16, we have inequality (4.2). This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
The proof above implies that 0 < e1(B   A)(I   A) 1 < 1, therefore we can always
choose proper values for a and b where 0 < a < b < 1 and conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are
satised.
Condition (4.1) means that the loss of deviation (to Invest) in an o¤-the-equilibrium-
path for an investor is greater than the benet of deviation, even if there is only one d-type
trustee. Therefore, the investor has no incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy
given any history.
Condition (4.2) controls the trustees incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy
in both on-the-equilibrium-path and o¤-the-equilibrium-path. When the trustee is on the
equilibrium path, the gain of deviation must be less than the gain from deterring starting
a defection. When the trustee is o¤ the equilibrium path, the loss of slowing down the
contagious procedure must be greater than the gain of slowing down the procedure when
there is already defection in the community.
Since the trustees gain of deviation on the equilibrium path is same as the loss of
deviation o¤ the equilibrium path, which is b, and the e¤ect of slowing down the contagious
procedure is larger when there are less d-type players, we can always nd b which satises
condition (4.2).6
There are two points we want to make about this result. First, please note that the
existence of the contagious equilibrium critically depends on the existence of the outside
option. The reasoning is as follows. The concept of contagious equilibrium is based on
community enforcement. Players change their partners over time and dishonest behavior
against one partner causes sanctions by other members in the society. For the development
of a cooperative social norm, this concept requires harsh punishment scheme. Not only are
6The other way to interpret Theorem 15 and Lemma 17 is as follows. For any n, and for any a and b
which satisfy condition (4.1), we can dene the relevant interval of  which satises condition (4.2). This
explanation becomes clear with Figure 11.
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deviators from the desired behavior punished, but a player who fails to punish is in turn
punished (Kandori (1992)). In the trust game the trustee has strong incentives to defect.
Then the corresponding cheated investor (now she is d-type) must defect forever even if she
meets a c-type trustee. To sustain this d-type investors defection in the o¤-the-equilibrium-
path, the outside option a must be high enough. Second, we can observe in (4.2) that the
discount factor, , has a strong e¤ect on the equilibrium payo¤ structure. The larger the
discount factor is, the higher level of Return (b) is required to support the equilibrium. The
logic is that in order to make a d-type trustee with a higher value in  defect forever in
an o¤-the-equilibrium-path, we should make a deviation from defection less attractive by
imposing a higher value on b (and a lower value on 1  b).
4.3 THE MODEL WITH PUBLIC RANDOMIZATION
In the previous section, we have shown that a community can sustain an e¢ cient outcome
under anonymous random matching by employing the contagious strategy. However, the
equilibrium is fragile in the sense that a small amount of noise (defection) causes the break-
down of trust and reciprocity in the whole community. On the contrary, if the equilibrium
always goes back to the original payo¤ point, it is robust to the mistakes of players. Here we
achieve global stability(Kandori (1992) by introducing public randomization device. Also
public randomizations play a signicant role in expanding the range of su¢ cient conditions
that support the social norm of trust and reciprocity by allowing the adjustment of players
continuation payo¤s.
We assume that, at the beginning of each period t, players observe a public random
variable t which is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0; 1]. The public
randomizations are used to adjust the severity of the punishment.
Given t we redene the types of the players as follows:
 t = 1, all players are c-type;
 t > 1, player i is c-type if (i) player i is c-type in t 1 and (Invest, Return) is the outcome
in t  1; or (ii) t 1 > . Otherwise player i is d-type.
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Denition 18. The contagious strategy with public randomization is dened as follows:
An investor invests if she is c-type and does not invest if she is d-type. A trustee returns if
he is c-type and does not return if he is d-type.
With this preparation, we can construct a stableequilibrium which sustain trust and
reciprocity under public randomization.
Theorem 19. Consider the random matching model with public randomization where 2n  4
players play the trust game with 0 < a < b < 1 and a  n 1
n
b. Then, 9 < 1 such
that 8 2 [; 1), the contagious strategy with public randomization constitutes a sequential
equilibrium in which (Invest, Return) is the outcome in every period along the equilibrium
path under uniformly random matching.
The formal equilibrium conditions are given as follows.
Lemma 20. The contagious strategy with public randomization constitutes a sequential equi-
librium if
a  n  1
n
b; (4.3)
and
g()  b  f(): (4.4)
The proof of Lemma 20 is similar to the proof of Lemma 17 and can be found in Appendix.
Here we provide the intuitive explanation for Theorem 19 and the proof in Figure 11. Suppose
the relevant value of b satisfying (4.3) is given. Since function f() dened in Lemma 1 is
continuous and increasing, we can always nd  2 (0; 1) where f() = b. By Lemma 16, we
have g() < f() = b. We dene   =. Then for any  2 [; 1),  =  and the condition
(4.4) in Lemma 20 is satised.
Remark The public randomization device dramatically expands the set of  which
supports the contagious strategy as a sequential equilibrium. Suppose there is no public
randomization, (i.e.,  = 1) and players play the same trust game. Then only  2 [; ]
supports the equilibrium7. Note that    cannot support the equilibrium. The intuition
7This also contrasts with the result of Kandori (1992), where the "contagious equilibrium" requires  to
be su¢ ciently large in the prisoners dilemma.
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Figure 11: Graphical explanation of Theorem 2 (with n = 5 and uniformly randommatching:
Matlab)
is that if  is very high, then a d-type trustee has a high incentive to cooperate in an o¤-
the-equilibrium path since g() > b in this case. This e¤ect is even stronger as the value
of b declines. When b is small enough, very short interval of  supports the equilibrium.
With a small b, the interval [; ] supporting the equilibrium gets shorter while the interval
[; 1] sustaining the equilibrium with randomizatons becomes bigger. Therefore, when the b is
small the set of  which supports the equilibrium expands dramatically with the introduction
of public randomizations.
4.4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that the social norm of trust and reciprocity is sustained in
equilibrium by the use of "contagious" punishments which lead eventually to the breakdown
of cooperation after a single deviation. Technically, our model is an extension of the theory
of repeated random matching games in which players not only do not observe the outcomes
of games in which they are not involved, but also are completely anonymous in that they can
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neither recognize nor communicate the identity of any of their past opponents. The results
illustrate that the contagious punishments are fairy powerful tool for enforcing a social norm
of trust and reciprocity.
We observe many important transactions in reality are infrequent in nature and many
transactions happen among essentially anonymous players. Electronic transactions are done
between strangers who have no contact except through cyberspace. In this case only partial
information about a strangers reputation is available at best, and, therefore, the e¤ective-
ness of reputation is far less certain. In all of the results above, we have tried to answer the
question of what factors drive the emergence of trust and reciprocity in economic transac-
tions.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we theoretically extend Kandori
(1992) and Ellison (1994)s argument to the trust game. These papers show that community
can sustain cooperation without any information processing in the setting of the prisoners
dilemma. And Kandori (1992) only shows that, under local information processing, a simple
form of community enforcement supports cooperation in the one-sided incentive problem. In
this paper, we have considered the one-sided incentive problem under the most extreme infor-
mation restriction. That is, players know nothing more than his or her personal experience
since they are completely anonymous in that they can neither recognize nor communicate
the identity of any of their past opponent. This is interesting since, as Ellison (1994) notes,
the results of the previous papers heavily rely on the fact that the prisoners dilemma has a
dominant strategy equilibrium. And it is important to know whether the results extend to
the other class of games.
Second, our results rationalizes many experimental results which show the signicant
level of trust and reciprocity in the laboratory. Many experimental researches have been
done to identify trust and reciprocity in an investment setting, and found that trust and
reciprocity prevail in the laboratory even under the conditions of complete anonymity and
one-shot interaction. They regard these behaviors irrational and explain them with some
psychological factors such as fairness, altruism and inequality aversion etc. The contribution
of this study is that we can identify trusting and reciprocating behavior as an equilibrium
phenomenon without changing the fundamental assumption in economics that individuals
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act in their own self interest. That is, we show that trust and reciprocity are consistent with
a rational choice of selsh players, and investigate how such a cooperative social norm is
sustained by self-interested group members in the community.
Finally, we expect that this study will help explain the emergence and prevalence of
e-Commerce which is important as the internet develops. The results of this study provide
the rst analysis of the development of trust and reciprocity among strangers based on the
concept of social norm. More generally, an understanding of the factors that determine the
development of the social norm among strangers is of obvious importance to the design and
operation of economic transactions and economic institutions.
We should note that we have left one important question to future research. The con-
tagious strategy is the most extreme punishment scheme, and the contagious equilibrium is
just one of a multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore, it would be interesting to characterize all
the possible equilibria, or, at least, to know whether other relaxed strategies could support
trust and reciprocity. It is also related to the question of whether Folk Theorem is applicable
in this setting.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
A: Formulas for Matrix A, Matrix B and Vector 
Matrix A is an n(n+ 2) n(n+ 2) transition matrix with elements aij = PrfZt+1 = j j
Zt = ig. Suppose Z 1t (i) = (Xt; Yt) = (p; q), and Z 1t+1(j) = (Xt+1; Yt+1) = (r; s). Then
aij =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
( qr p)(
n p
r p)(r p)!( pp+q r)(p+q r)!(n q)!
n!
,
if s = r, p  r, q  r, and r  p+ q;
0, otherwise.
Matrix B is an n(n+ 2) n(n+ 2) transition matrix with elements bij = PrfZt+1 = j j
Zt = i and one d-type trustee deviates to Return}. Suppose Z 1t (i) = (Xt; Yt) = (p; q), and
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Z 1t+1(j) = (Xt+1; Yt+1) = (r; s). Then
bij =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
aij, if q = 0;
(n pr p)(
q 1
r p)(r p)!( pp+q r)(p+q r)!(n q)!
n!
,
if s = r, 1  p  r, 1  q  r, and r  p+ q   1;
(n pr p)(
q 1
r p)(r p)!(n r1 )( pp+q r 1)(p+q r 1)!(n q)!
n!
,
if s = r + 1, 0  p  r, 1  q  r + 1, and r  p+ q   1;
0, otherwise.
 is an n(n+2)1 column vector with the ith element equal to the conditional probability
for the trustee to meet a c-type investor when the state is i in period t.
 = (
n
n
;    ; n
n| {z }
n elements
;
n  1
n
;    ; n  1
n| {z }
n+1 elements
;    ; 1
n
;    ; 1
n| {z }
n+1 elements
;
0
n
;    ; 0
n| {z }
n+1 elements
)T
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B: Proofs
We prove Lemma 16 by introducing the following notations similar as in Ellison (1994).
Proof. Dene ! as the random variable whose realization is a pairing of all players in each
period. Dene oi(t; !) as player is opponent in period t for a given realization of !.
Dene the sets CI(t; p; q; !) and CT (t; p; q; !) by
CI(0; p; q; !) = fp+ 1; p+ 2;    ; ng;
CT (0; p; q; !) = fn+ q + 1; n+ q + 2;    ; 2ng;
CI(t+ 1; p; q; !) = fi 2 CI(t; p; q; !) j oi(t; !) 2 CT (t; p; q; !)g;
CT (t+ 1; p; q; !) = fi 2 CT (t; p; q; !) j oi(t; !) 2 CI(t; p; q; !)g:
CI(t; p; q; !) and CT (t; p; q; !) will be the set of c-type investors and c-type trustees in period
t when every player plays contagious strategy and the sets of players f1; 2;    ; pg and fn+
1; n+ 2;    ; n+ qg are the d-type investors and d-type trustees in period 0.
Dene the set D(t; !) by
D(0; !) = f2ng;
D(t+ 1; !) = D(t; !) [ fi j oi(t; !) 2 D(t; !)g:
D(t; !) gives the set of d-type players in period t suppose that the trustee 2n is the only
d-type player in period 0.
From equation (1), Z 1(1) = (0; 1) and Z 1(n+ 2) = (1; 1), then
f() = e1(B   A)(I   A) 1
= 
1X
t=0
te1(B   A)At
= E![
1X
t=1
t Pr(o2n(t; !) 2 CI(t; 0; 0; !) \D(t; !))];
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and
g() = en+2(B   A)(I   A) 1
= 
1X
t=0
ten+2(B   A)At
= E![
1X
t=1
t Pr(o2n(t; !) 2 CI(t; 1; 0; !) \D(t; !))]:
We show that
E![
1X
t=1
t Pr(o2n(t; !) 2 CI(t; 0; 0; !) \D(t; !))]
 E![
1X
t=1
t Pr(o2n(t; !) 2 CI(t; 1; 0; !) \D(t; !))]
by showing that the inequality holds for every realization of !, i.e.,
1X
t=1
tI(o2n(t; !) 2 CI(t; 0; 0; !) \D(t; !))

1X
t=1
tI(o2n(t; !) 2 CI(t; 1; 0; !) \D(t; !)) (.1)
(The notation I(E) indicates a function equal to one or zero depending on whether the
deterministic condition E is true or false.) The denition of CI implies that
CI(t; 1; 0; !)  CI(t; 0; 0; !);
so
CI(t; 1; 0; !) \D(t; !)  CI(t; 0; 0; !) \D(t; !):
and the inequality (.1) gives the desired result.
Proof of (16):
f() = e1(B   A)(I   A) 1
= 
1X
t=0
te1(B   A)At.
e1(B   A)At is the di¤erence in the probability for a trustee to meet a c-type invest after
t periods when he chooses to start defection in next period and when he chooses to start
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defection in the current period. Therefore e1(B A)At > 0 and it goes to 0 with probability
1 when t goes to innite.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 17 and Theorem 15, we have only to prove that one-shot
deviations from the strategy are unprotable after any history for both investors and trustees.
For ease of exposition, let 	I denote the sum of expected payo¤ for investors when s > 
for all s  t, and let 	T denote the sum of expected payo¤ for trustees when s >  for all
s  t, given that all the players follow the contagious strategy with public randomization.
	I =
1X
t=1
tt 1(1  ) b
1   ;
	T =
1X
t=1
tt 1(1  )1  b
1   :
First, a one-shot deviation from the equilibrium path is unprotable for a trustee, i.e.,
1  b
1   
1X
t=0
tte1A
t+	T :
This inequality can be simplied to yield inequality:
1  b  (1  )e1(I   A) 1:
By
(1  )e1(I   A) 1+ e1(B   A)(I   A) 1 = 1,
we have
b  e1(B   A)(I   A) 1: (.2)
Second, a one-shot deviation from the equilibrium path is unprotable for the investor if
b
1   
a
1   +	I :
This condition is always satised given that b > a.
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Next, we provide a su¢ cient condition for a one-shot deviation from an o¤-the-equilibrium-
path to be unprotable for the investor under any consistent belief, which supports the con-
tagious equilibrium as a sequential equilibrium. A d-type investor nds a one-shot deviation
from No Invest forever to be unprotable for any number of d-type trustees if
a
1   +	I 
n  l
n
b+ 
a
1   +	I ; 8 l = 1; 2; : : : ; n
The condition is binding when n = 1 and it can be simplied into inequality
a  n  1
n
b: (.3)
Finally, a one-shot deviation from an o¤-the-equilibrium-path is unprotable for the
trustee under any consistent belief. A d-type trustee nds a one-shot deviation from No
Return forever to be unprotable given Zt = k, for all k = n+ 2; : : : ; n(n+ 2), if
1 +
1X
t=1
ttekA
t+	T  (1  b) + 
1X
t=0
ttekBA
t+	T :
The inequality can be simplied into
b  ek(B   A)(I   A) 1 for k = n+ 2; : : : ; n(n+ 2):
This condition is binding when k = n + 2. Therefore it su¢ ces to show the following
inequality is satised
b  en+2(B   A)(I   A) 1. (.4)
Proof. For any 0 < b < 1, 9  2 (0; 1) such that
b = e1(B   A)(I   A) 1
by property (i) of Lemma 16. And by property (iii) of Lemma 16,
b > en+2(B   A)(I   A) 1.
Then for any  2 [; 1), dene () = =. So inequality (4.4) is satised automatically.
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